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Over the past five years, America has become enthralled and
obsessed with the demonic "sexual predator."' Politicians have manipu-
lated images of incorrigible sexual monsters to win elections2 and rally
support for crowd-pleasing legislation.3 Mainstream media have joined
1. During the past five years, the term "sexual predator" has been used with increasing
frequency to describe repeat sex offenders. For example, a search of all of the Nexis news files
that predate 1992 reveals just 302 references to the term "sexual predator." Search of LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News File. By contrast, the Nexis news files for just the first six months of 1997,
contain more than 1000 references to "sexual predator." Search of LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
File. Although the term "sexual predator" has only recently been popularized, our society has
always been both fascinated and terrified by sexual violence. See generally Raquel Blacher,
Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sexual Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary
Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REv. 889 (1995) (tracing 200 years of
Anglo-American interest in sex crimes and the resulting public legislative responses). "Sexual
predator" does not have a precise legal meaning. However, terms such as "sexual predator" and
"sex offender" have generally been used to refer to individuals who have a history of
committing crimes of a sexual nature, including rape, sexual assault, or child molestation.
2. See, e.g., Chip Limehouse, State Has Duty to Protect Citizens from Sexual Predators,
THE POST & COURIER, July 9, 1997, at 6 (discussing proposals by a South Carolina politician
to establish post-sentence civil confinement laws for sexual predators); Sexual Offenders Belong
in Jail, THE ATLANTA CONST., July 6, 1997, at 4F (criticizing proposals by two Georgia
politicians to establish post-sentence civil confinement laws for sexual predators).
3. One additional legal development aimed at the sexual predator is the advent of
[Vol. 49
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413415
forces with tabloid news organizations to titillate the public with images
of lurking fiends, disguised as our next-door-neighbors,4 just waiting to
terrorize women and children.' It is as if Freddy Krueger has invaded
our social consciousness as effortlessly as he did his victims' dreams.'
As politicians and the media capitalize on the public fascination with
sexual violence, this national spotlight increases our collective awareness
of one type of criminal violence.7 Heightened public sensitivity leads
mandatory community notification for sex offenders. On May 17, 1996, a federal version of New
Jersey's Megan's Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1995), was signed into
law by President Clinton. Megan's Laws require community notification and registration of
released sex offenders. President Clinton made the following remarks at the signing ceremony:
Study after study has shown us that sex offenders commit crime after crime....
From now on, every state in the country will be required by law to tell a
community when a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. We respect
people's rights, but today America proclaims there is no greater right than a
parent's right to raise a child in safety and love. Today, America warns, if you
dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you wherever you go, state to
state, town to town.
Text of Signing Ceremony of Meghan's [sic] Law (CNN television broadcast, May 17, 1996),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File, at transcript 1202-15. Mandatory community
notification laws are beyond the scope of this Article and have been addressed elsewhere. See,
e.g., Robert J. Martin, Pursuing Public Protection Through Mandatory Community Notification
of Convicted Sex Offenders: The Trials and Tribulations of Megan's Law, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
29 (1996).
4. The nationally-publicized 1994 murder of seven year-old Megan Kanka sparked
campaigns to enact community notification statutes for sexual predators in her home state of
New Jersey and throughout the U.S. See Martin, supra note 3, at 29-33. This famous crime is
consistently described as having been committed by her "pedophile neighbor." See, e.g., Note,
Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex
Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1712 n.13 (1996) [hereinafter Prevention Versus
Punishment].
5. People have a morbid fascination with the concept of the sexual predator, symbolized
in Western culture by the archetype of the vampire. See Meredith Renwick, Out of the Coffin,
Into the Culture: Why Vampires Are a Fad in the 1990's, THE TORONTO SUN, June 2, 1996,
at CIO (describing "the vampire as a sexual predator" as "the most enduring element of the
myth") (emphasis added). This connection is not lost on the mainstream press, especially when
it can be exploited to garner public attention. See, e.g., Don't Care for Study's Result? Do It
Again, FLORIDA TIMES UNION, Aug. 15, 1996, at BI (describing a "vampire rapist" who drank
the blood of his victims as a "sexual predator").
6. See A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line 1984) (depicting Wes Craven's
villain, Freddy Krueger, who invades the dreams of his teenage victims to commit acts of sexual
violence and murder).
7. See Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator: Constitutional Ramifications
of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1996) (citing
the controversial and well-publicized trials of William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson as
catalysts for the public perception of a flawed legal system that, in turn, lead to the enactment
of Rules 413-415); Leonore M.J. Simon, Symposium: The Treatment of Sex Offenders: The Myth
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
to greater general interest and more visible expressions of community
outrage at violent sexual crimes.' The process comes full circle when
legislators and the judiciary respond to perceived public concern by
being "hard" on sex offenders. 9 This is the political and social climate
that has created the "sexual predator" as jargon and encouraged the
development of new legal rules designed to convict and confine these
public villains.
As soon as we created the concept of the "sexual predator," Congress
and the Supreme Court acted swiftly to isolate this well-publicized threat
to public safety by arming prosecutors and civil claimants with unique
and powerful artillery. In the last two years: (1) Congress enacted Rules
413, 414, and 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules 413-415),
which dramatically expand the scope of evidence that may be used
against an accused in federal criminal and civil sexual assault and child
molestation cases; and (2) in Kansas v. Hendricks," the Supreme Court
upheld the indefinite post-sentence civil confinement of "sexually violent
of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 387, 402 (1997) (discussing how highly publicized child molestation crimes
increase public fear of the repeat sex offender).
8. See Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need
to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 213-14 (1991) (describing how public outrage in
Washington state following a highly-publicized child molestation case pressured the governor
to appoint a task force that subsequently produced the first "Sexually Violent Predator Law" in
the country).
9. The two legal developments discussed in this Article, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-
415 and the sexual predator confinement statutes, are commonly interpreted as legislative and
judicial responses to community outrage over sexual violence. This conclusion is supported by
the legislative history of Rules 413-415. See 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari) (Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 were introduced primarily as
a response to the public perception of inadequacy in the prosecution of sexual predators); 138
CONG. REC. S15160 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1992) (statement of Sen. Dole). This conclusion is also
supported by the opinions of legal commentators. See American Bar Association Criminal
Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 353 (1995)
(stating the Rules 413-415 were an effort by Congress "to appear tough on crime") [hereinafter
ABA Report]; Livnah, supra note 7, at 171-72 (stating that the Senate's initial proposal for
Rules 413-415, in March 1991, specifically cited the need to respond to public concerns that the
American legal system could not adequately address increased violence against women and
children). Similarly, the sexual predator confinement statutes have been viewed as a response
to community pressure. See Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 278 (1992) (referring
to the first "Sexually Violent Predator" statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902
(West 1975 & Supp. 1998), as a response "to public outcry against a string of brutal sex
crimes").
10. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
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predators."" Together, these recent legal developments form a compre-
hensive program designed to increase conviction rates and indefinitely
extend confinement terms for sex offenders.
On July 9, 1995, Congress enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413-
415.2 These new rules were promulgated pursuant to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994."3 Rules 413-415
11. Id. at 2086.
12. Rule 413 reads, in relevant part:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EVID. 413.
Rule 414, reads in relevant part:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EvID. 414.
Rule 415, reads in relevant part:
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a
party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault
or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered
as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
FED. R. EvID. 415.
Rules 413-415 apply only to the small number of criminal and civil sex offense actions
litigated in the federal courts. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A New Hurdle as a Deal Nears on a
Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, Al (stating that federal cases account for only 3-5% of
all U.S. sex offense prosecutions). However, thirty-four states and Puerto Rico have adopted
evidentiary rules based, at least in part, on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Louis M. Natali,
Jr. & Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?,": How Sexual Propensity
Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 1, 21 (1996). Thus, given the
public obsession with sex offenses and the history of states modeling their evidentiary rules after
the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is a strong possibility that many states will follow this lead
and enact similar amendments to their evidentiary rules.
13. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. art. IV, FED. R. EVID.
413-415 (1994)) (effective July 9, 1995).
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dramatically increase the likelihood that individuals accused of sex
offenses will be convicted by creating a unique evidentiary presumption
that testimony regarding a defendant's prior sex offenses is admissible
in federal sexual assault and child molestation cases.14 Under Rules
413-415, federal prosecutors and certain civil claimants'5 can reach
back into a person's remote past, dredge up allegations or evidence of
uncharged and unrelated sex offenses and present this testimony directly
to the jury.16 In addition, these rules provide prosecutors and civil
claimants with a unique opportunity to argue that testimony regarding
a defendant's past proves that he has a propensity to commit sex
crimes. 7 Rules 413-415 are so new that they have just begun to reach
the federal courts.1
On June 23, 1997, less than two years after Rules 413-415 became
law, the Supreme Court made its own contribution to the arsenal used
14. See 137 CONG. REC. at 53240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (stating that the probative
value of evidence regarding a defendant's prior sex offenses is "strong").
15. See supra note 12 (Rules 413 and 414 apply to federal criminal cases and Rule 415
applies to federal civil sexual assault and child molestation cases.).
It is interesting to note the speculation that Paula Corbin Jones would use Rule 415 to
introduce allegations and evidence of President Clinton's sexual history in her civil lawsuit. See
Ellen Goodman, In the Game of Mutual Public Humiliation, Paula Jones Is One Up, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 2, 1997, at C7 (referencing the opinion of Professor Jane Aiken of Washington
University that Ms. Jones' attorney will attempt to portray President Clinton as a sexual
predator in order to take advantage of Rule 415); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Casting Stones, THE
NEw YORKER, Nov. 3, 1997, at 54 (describing how "[l]awyers for the plaintiff [Paula Corbin
Jones] will attempt to portray the President as a sexual predator").
16. See 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (statement of Sen. Dole that Rules 413-415 do not place
any time limit on the admission of prior sex offenses); 140 CONG. REc. H8992 (statement of
Rep. Molinari) (supporting the admission of prior sex offenses "notwithstanding very substantial
lapses of time"); see also Natali & Stigall, supra note 12, at 30 (noting that because Rules 413-
415 do not restrict evidence to a certain time frame prosecutors can proffer allegations that are
more than ten years old). Compare FED. R. EVID. 609(b) (prohibiting the admission of evidence
of a conviction of a crime that is more than 10 years old to attack the credibility of a witness,
"unless the court determines ... that the probative value.., supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect").
17. Propensity evidence, sometimes referred to as character evidence, is presented to prove
that the defendant is the kind of person who would have committed a certain type of crime. The
congressional sponsors of the new rules clearly intended that Rules 413-415 permit the
admission of prior sex offense allegations and evidence to prove propensity and character. See
140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari). Without Rules
413-415, propensity evidence is generally excluded under Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See infra note 62 (quoting the text of Rule 404).
18. In 1997, the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals issued the first comprehen-
sive analyses of the new evidentiary rules. See infra pt. I.B.1. (discussing United States v.
Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997) and United States v. Sumner, 119 F3d 658 (8th Cir.
1997)).
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against sexual predators. In its recent, controversial decision in Kansas
v. Hendricks,19 the Court affirmed the right of a state to civilly confine
any "sexually violent predator 20 for an indefinite period of time after
he has finished serving his prison sentence.21
There is a logical and sequential relationship between these two legal
developments. Rules 413-415 get the sexual predator off the streets by
expanding the scope of admissible evidence in sexual assault and child
molestation cases, thereby increasing sex offender conviction rates. After
the sex offender has been convicted, incarcerated, and served his prison
sentence, sexual predator confinement laws keep the sexual predator off
the streets by indefinitely postponing his release from confinement.
Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement statutes also
share three scientific-sounding justifications that have been widely
accepted with little critical analysis: (1) that future sexual violence can
be accurately predicted based on allegations and evidence of prior sex
crimes; (2) that sex offenders have unusually high rates of recidivism;
and (3) that certain criminals specialize in sex offenses. Proponents of
Rules 413-415 and the sex offender confinement statutes have accepted
these justifications without critical analysis and used them to explain the
harsh and disparate treatment of this one type of criminal offense.
However, the available empirical evidence highlights fundamental
weaknesses in all three justifications.22
Rules 413-415 and the sex offender confinement statutes are a
significant departure from normal criminal practice and procedure23
without sufficient justification in law or science. Under these new laws,
if a defendant is charged with rape, fact finders will hear compelling
testimony 4 regarding his entire history of sexual misconduct,25 despite
19. 117 S. Ct. at 2072.
20. There is no legal or semantic distinction between the terms "sexually violent predator,"
"sexual predator," and "sex offender" and they will be used interchangeably throughout this
Article.
21. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2072. The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act at issue in
this case is closely related to the sex offender confinement statutes that have been enacted in 19
states. See infra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing sex offender confinement statutes
throughout the United States).
22. See infra pt. III (discussing the fact that there is no reliable empirical evidence for the
three assumptions underlying both Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement statutes).
23. See Jeffrey G. Pickett, Note & Comment, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled:
The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of Other Sexual Offense Evidence in
Washington, 70 WASH. L. REV. 883, 883 (1995) (stating that Rules 413-415 "change two
hundred years of evidentiary jurisprudence").
24. In fact, sponsors of Rules 413-415 specifically argued that evidence of a defendant's
past sexual offenses is such a strong indicator of guilt that jurors should specifically consider
the improbability that the same person would be mistakenly accused of a sexual offense more
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
the high probability that such uncharged, unsubstantiated, and remote
testimony will significantly increase the likelihood of prejudice,26 due
process violations, 7 and mistake. Introduction of this testimony to
support conviction or indefinite confinement is likely to improperly
influence jurors and judges by interfering with their ability to: (1)
rationally weigh the relevant evidence;29 (2) ascertain that the prosecu-
than once. See 137 CONG. REC. S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (stating that the occurence of
multiple false accusations is "highly improbable"). Of course, the possibility of misidentification
is increased if, as is often the case, the defendant first became a suspect because he was known
to the police based on his past criminal record. These type of assumptions are the very reason
that evidence of prior criminal acts has traditionally been excluded. According to Wigmore:
[I]t is because of the indubitable relevancy of specific bad acts showing the
character of the accused that such evidence is excluded. It is objectionable not
because it has no probative value but because it has too much. The natural and
inevitable tendency of the tribunal is to give excessive weight to the vicious record
of crime.
JOHN H. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 62.2, at 1212-13 (Tillers, rev. ed.
1993).
25. Rules 413-415 specifically contemplate the admission of allegations and evidence of
prior sex offenses dating back to an accused's remote past. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text. Unlike all other civil commitment procedures, under the sexual predator
confinement statutes, there is no requirement that the allegations that form the basis for the
commitment decision be recent. Obviously, if a state intends to initiate commitment proceedings
after an inmate has served his full prison term, a recency requirement would defeat that goal,
when even the criminal act that resulted in the immediately preceding prison term may be
remote in time.
26. Prejudice does not simply mean that the evidence is damaging to the defense. Rather,
prejudice results when the evidence causes the fact-finder to decide the case on an improper
basis or because the evidence is unduly persuasive and insufficiently probative of the
defendant's guilt. See Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A
Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 524 (1991); see also Livnah, supra note
7, at 180 (arguing that "evidence of prior sexual assault and child molestation [will] have a
greater effect on the jury than evidence of prior nonviolent or nonsexual crimes").
27. Due process requires that a defendant be judged according to the relevant evidence
probative of the current charge. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that
due process requires the prosecution to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt [] every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged").
28. See infra text accompanying notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing how
Rules 413-415 increase the probability of prejudice, due process violations, and mistake); infra
text accompanying notes 72-76 (discussing how sexual predator confinement statutes permit
prosecutors to use outdated and unsupported allegations to indefinitely confine sexual predators).
29. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 396 (1966)
(discussing the empirical confirmation provided by the Chicago Jury Project of the fact that
propensity evidence prevents jurors from being impartial triers of fact by generating hostility
towards the defendant, especially if a previous victim was a child); Natali & Stigall, supra note
12, at 24-29 (describing how Rules 413-415 unconstitutionally require the factfinder to make
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tor has met his burden of proof;3" (3) make the necessary factual
findings to establish any mental abnormality; 31 or (4) realistically
balance a prospective assessment of danger to society against the
individual's personal freedom.32 At the same time, the defendant on
trial for murder in the adjacent courtroom cannot be subjected to Rule
413-415 evidence and, if convicted, is ineligible for post-sentence civil
confinement.
Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement statutes single
out one type of crime for enhanced prosecution and punishmente3 based
on public fear, hatred, and desire for revenge. Politicians, the media, and
some vociferous groups and individuals have worked together to focus
public attention on sexual violance. Although sex crimes are a real and
serious social problem, state and federal governments already have
procedures for convicting and confining criminals, for example,
enhanced and consecutive sentencing, recidivism statutes, and decreased
plea bargain, parole, and probation authority. However, these groups
consider those accused or convicted of sex offenses to be undeserving
of the same legal rights as other defendants.
There are two obvious dangers to a system that uses public abhor-
rence to erode individual rights by increasing the government's ability
to convict, incarcerate, and indefinitely detain individuals who commit
certain crimes. The first is that as public opinion changes, lawmakers
will continue to expand the field of individuals considered unworthy of
constitutional protection. The second is that the new rules threaten to
irrational and arbitrary inferences).
30. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 9, at 349 ("Jurors may be overwhelmed by an
emotional response to the evidence [admitted under Rules 413-415] which interferes with their
ability to hold the prosecution to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."); James J.
Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly
Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 ER.D. 95, 110 (1994) (describing how jurors, exposed
to evidence of past criminal behavior, may feel less responsible for their decision to convict,
even without evidence sufficient to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition:
The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 285,
288 (1995) (describing how a jury repulsed by evidence of prior bad acts may overlook
weaknesses in the prosecution's case).
31. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text (discussing the problems associated
with a determining a mental abnormality).
32. See infra pt. III.A. (discussing the problems associated with predicting future sex
offenses).
33. See Mary K. Danna, Note, The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The
Prejudice of Politics or Just Plain Common Sense?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 277, 297 (1996)
(stating that Rules 413-415 "provide for differential treatment of a particular type of crime: sex
offenses").
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blur the distinctions between punishment of criminals and treatment of
the mentally ill.
34
The recent creation of the sexual predator as a legal concept raises
critical questions about our criminal justice system. This Article explores
the development of the "sexual predator" category and discusses how
this new category of criminal fits within the existing judicial system.
This Article begins by examining the origins of Rules 413-415. Second,
this Article explores the recent federal court cases that provide the first
interpretations and applications of Rules 413-415. Third, this Article
discusses the origins of state sexual predator confinement statutes.
Fourth, this Article discusses the Supreme Court's 1997 decision,
Kansas v. Hendricks, upholding the constitutionality of the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predators Act. Fifth, this Article demonstrates that
there is no reliable empirical evidence to support the core factual, legal,
and psychological assumptions that underlie the very concept of a sexual
predator, by reviewing the most recent and relevant data on predictions
of sexual violence, recidivism, and criminal specialization. Finally, this
Article argues that, taken together, Rules 413-415 and Kansas v.
Hendricks, reflect a legislative and judicial reaction to the current
demonization of one type of violence. This response disregards the
accuracy and effectiveness of these new legal schemes" and threatens
to undermine the consistent and fair application of our criminal laws.
I. RULES 413-415: GETTNG THE SEXUAL
PREDATOR OFF THE STREETS
A. The Legislative History of Rules 413-415
Congress enacted Rules 413-415 on September 13, 1994, as part of
the Violent Crime Control Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Crime
Bill).3 ' However, these rules were initially drafted three years earlier,
34. See Brief for the National Mental Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at *2, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (referring to the
Kansas sexual predator confinement statute as "a misguided attempt to 'medicalize' the
behavior of people who commit sexually violent offenses") [hereinafter Brief for the National
Mental Health Association].
35. Obviously, a mere increase in the rate of conviction of sexual predators is only of
societal value if the vast majority of the defendants are guilty of the charged offense. Similarly,
an increase in the number of individuals confined is only of value if the vast majority of sexual
predators confined under the sexual predator confinement statutes actually "suffer[] from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1994).
36. See supra note 13.
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during the Bush Administration,37 and were essentially unchanged
during numerous unsuccessful enactment attempts between 1991 and
1994.38 In fact, when the new evidentiary rules were first proposed in
March 1991 they were rejected by Congressional Democrats who
viewed the new rules as unconstitutional.39
Proponents of Rules 413-415 have consistently claimed that these
rules are necessary to correct a grave imbalance in the American system
of criminal justice.' The Congressional Record is replete with purport-
ed explanations and justifications for the new rules including that: (1)
women and children must be protected from rapists and child molest-
ers;41 (2) sex crimes are generally committed by recidivists;'2 (3)
admitting allegations and evidence of prior sex offenses will result in
more convictions;43 (4) admitting allegations and evidence of prior sex
offenses will avoid delays caused by battles over admissibility;' (5) the
rules are necessary to bolster the credibility of sex crime victims;45 and
(6) the rules will solve the problem of "technical" reversals on
appeal.46
In August of 1994, Republican Representative Susan Molinari
became the most vocal proponent of Rules 413-415 within the House of
37. See 137 CONG. REC. S3212 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (containing the text of Rules
413-415, in 801 of S. 635, 102 Cong. (1991)).
38. See Natali & Stigall, supra note 12, at 4 n.27 (listing 18 separate congressional
attempts to promulgate Rules 413-415 between 1991 and 1994).
39. See Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-414: Introduction, 22
FoRDHAm URn. L.J. 265, 266 (1995).
40. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. at H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari); 138 CONG. REC. S15160 (Sept. 25, 1992) (statement of Sen. Dole).
41. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
("I have long sought to protect the public from crimes of sexual violence .. "); 137 CoNG.
REC. S4925 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating that the new rules would
protect against "those criminals who prey on women").
42. See 140 CONG. REc. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
43. See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl).
Although Rules 413-415 are likely to increase the conviction rates for sex offenders, this
argument ignores the fact that the current federal conviction rate for sex offenses is already 84%,
which is considerably higher than the rate for other crimes. See David J. Karp, Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15,
22 (1994). There is also a strong possibility that Rules 413-415 would increase convictions
among both the innocent and the guilty. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
44. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
45. See 140 CONG. REc. H8992 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
("Knowledge that the defendant has committed rapes on other occasions is frequently critical
in assessing the relative plausibility of these claims and accurately deciding cases that would
otherwise become unresolvable swearing matches.").
46. See 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
("current law encourages reversals").
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Representatives when she announced her intention to block passage of
the Crime Bill unless it included the new evidentiary rules. 7 While
Representative Molinari led the effort in the House, Minority Leader
Bob Dole was regaling the Senate with the tale of Charles R. Getz,
convicted in 1988 of raping his eleven year-old daughter.4' According
to Senator Dole, after the Delaware Supreme Court overturned Getz's
conviction based on the improper admission of prior assaults, "the
defendant walked., 49 Of course this outcome should seem odd to any
first-year law student. In fact, Getz was immediately retried, convicted,
and sentenced to life in prison. However, the real story of Charles R.
Getz would have had little influence on a Congress intent on responding
to perceived public fear and outrage towards the sexual predator.5'
In its desire to satisfy public bloodlust, Congress bypassed its usual
rulemaking procedures when it enacted Rule 413-415.52 The routine
process, which involves a proposal by the Advisory Committee of the
Judicial Conference, a period of public comment, Supreme Court
adoption and congressional review, was completely ignored.53 Instead,
the Crime Bill established a mechanism granting the "Judicial Confer-
ence 150 days from the date of enactment to recommend amendments
to the Rule[s]." '54 Under this process, if the Judicial Conference failed
to make any recommended changes within the 150 days, the rules would
47. See 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari);
140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
48. Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 728 (Del. 1988).
49. 140 CONG. REC. at S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
50. See generally Getz v. State, 582 A.2d 935 (Del. 1990). In fact, the congressional
proponents of Rules 413-415 did not offer any evidence that a single guilty person had ever
gone free because of evidence excluded under the existing federal rules. See Duane, supra note
30, at 100-01.
51. See supra note 11 (discussing how Rules 413-415 were enacted in response to
perceived public fear, hatred, and desire for revenge).
52. Although some members of Congress opposed Rules 413415, see, e.g., 140 CONG.
REC. S10,277 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden); 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily
ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schumer), there was no serious discussion or presentation
of empirical evidence regarding the percentage of accused sex offenders (with prior criminal
records) who are innocent and the potential effect of the new rules on those individuals. See 140
CONG. REC. H5438 (statement of Rep. Hughes) (opposing Rules 413-415 on the grounds that
the existing rule-making process, which requires "a minimum of six levels of scrutiny" was
ignored and that the rules were offered "after about 20 minutes' debate, without very much
thought, and... [are] procedurally and substantively flawed").
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994); FED. R. EVID. 1102; see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
ET AL., 3 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1808-09 (6th ed. 1994); ABA Report, supra
note 9, at 350 (arguing that if Rules 413-415 had gone through the normal Rules Enabling Act
process, some empirical justification would have been required).
54. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 53, at 575, 580, 583.
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become effective 300 days after their original enactment, unless
Congress provided otherwise." If the Judicial Conference approved the
rules, the rules automatically would become effective thirty days after
the transmittal of Judicial Conference approval. 6
The Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference transmitted its
report to Congress on February 9, 1995." The Advisory Committee,
with the single exception of the Department of Justice, unanimously
opposed the new rules."8 The Advisory Committee specifically conclud-
ed that Rules 413-415 would improperly: (1) "permit the admission of
unfairly prejudicial evidence;"59 (2) cause significant trial delay by
creating "mini-trials within trials;"' and (3) "diminish significantly the
protections that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases and
parties in civil cases against undue prejudice."61 Thus, the Advisory
Committee recommended that Congress reconsider Rules 413-415, or in
the alternative, that the provisions of Rules 413-415 be instead
incorporated as amendments to existing Rules 40462 and 40563 of the
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
CASES (submitted to Congress in accordance with section 320935 of the Violent Crimes Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51 (1995)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
58. See id. at 53 (emphasizing the highly unusual near-unanimity of the members'
opposition to the new rules); see also ABA Report, supra note 9, at 343-53 (describing the
ABA's opposition to Rules 413-415).
59. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 57, at 52.
60. See id. at 53.
61. See id. These concerns were specifically articulated by the ABA Criminal Justice
Section:
Undoubtedly, a few cases will always exist in which the only relevancy link for
admission is propensity and exclusion may result in what some believe to be an
unwarranted retrial or acquittal. However, to catch that relatively small number of
cases, the proponents of Rules 413-415 would drastically alter one of the
fundamental premises underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence. Currently, we do
not round up the regular suspects and try them based on evidence of who they are
rather than what they did in the particular case.
ABA Report, supra note 9, at 349 (emphasis added).
62. Federal Rule of Evidence 404 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Federal Rules of Evidence "in order to 'clarify drafting ambiguities and
eliminate constitutional infirmities.' "'
Despite this strong opposition within the legal community,65
Congress ignored the Advisory Committee's recommendations. On July
9, 1995, Rules 413-415 became effective, as originally proposed.
B. Assessing the Scope and Effect of Rules 413-415
Rules 413-415 specifically permit the admission of all "evidence of
[a defendant's] commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault or child molestation."'  The rules do not require evidence of a
prior conviction. Moreover, Rules 413-415 do not specify a standard of
proof for admissible evidence.67 Thus, Rules 413-415 could be used to
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice ... of the general nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
63. Federal Rule of Evidence 405 reads as follows:
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry
is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.
FED. R. EviD. 405.
64. Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
265, 267 n.10 (1995) (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 57, at 1).
65. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Advisory Committee's
conclusions); see also ABA Report, supra note 9, at 352 (predicting that an additional negative
effects of the adoption of Rules 413-415 will be the erosion of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence (the Federal Rape Shield Law)).
66. See supra note 12 (quoting text of Rules 413-415).
67. See Norman M. Garland, Perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
413-415: Some Thoughts on the Sexual Misconduct Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 355, 357 (1995) (stating that some commentators have
criticized the new rules for failing to limit admissible evidence to convictions and omitting a
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admit arrests where no charge was made, acquittals, juvenile records,
and unsupported accusations stretching back through the defendant's
lifetime.
Rules 413-415 recently have been tested in the federal courts. These
cases show that the federal judiciary has taken seriously Congress'
intent that "in general the probative value of such evidence is strong,
and is not outweighed by any overriding risk of prejudice." 8 Thus,
courts have been willing to use Rules 413-415 to admit uncharged and
remote allegations of a defendant's prior sex offenses. In fact, some
courts have specifically concluded that Rules 413-415 permit the
admission of allegations and evidence to prove a defendant's propensity
to commit criminal acts, that would otherwise be excluded.69 If future
courts follow these judicial interpretations, Rules 413-415 will likely
expand the scope of permissible allegations and evidence regarding prior
offenses well beyond the circumscribed limits of Rule 404.70 Taken
standard of proof).
68. 137 CONG. REC. S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
69. See FED. R. EVID. 404. Propensity evidence is excluded under Rule 404 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, see supra note 62 (quoting text of Rule 404), unless it also satisfies one of
the rule's specified exceptions. This is because:
[c]haracter evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened
on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good
man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what
the evidence in the case shows actually happened.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note (quoting Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep.,
Rec. & Studies 615 (1964)).
The dangers of propensity evidence have been specifically recognized by the Supreme Court.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988) (expressing "concern" that evidence
of prior bad acts might carry a risk of "unfair prejudice"). These dangers also have been
addressed by legal commentators:
If the rule against the use of character evidence [Rule 404] means anything, a
broad sexual proclivity exception available in all sex offense prosecutions is utterly
inexplicable.... [I]f character evidence generally is excluded because its
prejudicial impact normally outweighs its probative value, this theory of exclusion
arguably applies to evidence of prior sexual misconduct-evidence of a most
inflammatory type.. . . If we wish to use sexual propensity evidence against an
accused, consistency demands that we abolish the propensity rule in its entirety.
IA WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 62.2, at 1345 (Peter fillers rev. 1983).
70. Rules 413-415 may represent the beginning of a broader effort to eliminate the ban
on propensity evidence embodied in Rule 404. Legal commentatu-s anticipated the potential
conflict between the new rules and Rule 404 even before the federal courts had the opportunity
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together, these decisions confirm that under Rules 413-415, an individu-
al accused of a sex crime may be denied the statutory and constitutional
protections afforded other suspected offenders.71
The admission of allegations and evidence of past sexual offenses to
establish guilt directly or indirectly (for example, by proving a propensi-
ty to commit certain crimes) creates substantial risks. Rules 413-415
increase the likelihood of prejudice72 and due process violations 3
because these rules allow jurors to convict a defendant by inferring that
allegations or evidence of past sexual offenses, which may be mistak-
en74 or extremely outdated,75 prove that he committed the current
for review. See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra note 16, at 23-24 ("Because of the mandatory
nature of the rules, in sexual assault and child molestation cases, the Federal Rules' general
prohibition on the admission of character evidence to show disposition to commit offenses does
not apply."); Livnah, supra note 7, at 176 (discussing the "troubling ambiguity regarding
whether the amendments [Rules 413-415] permit the application of Federal Rule of Evidence
403"); James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems and
Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 753, 755-57 (1995) (stating that the new rules
directly contravene Rule 404, which generally proscribes the use of propensity evidence).
In addition, Rules 413-415 may open the door to the admission of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay evidence to prove a defendant's propensity to commit a particular crime. Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(21) permits the admission of all hearsay in the form of "[r]eputation of a
person's character among associates or in the community." FED. R. EVID. 803(21). Rule
803(21) is rarely used because Rule 404 precludes evidence of a person's character to show
propensity. However, under Rules 413-415, prosecutors and certain civil claimants may now be
permitted to offer hearsay testimony regarding the defendant's "reputation" for sexual
aggression.
71. See Duane, supra note 30, at 104 (stating that "the new rules.., single out sexual
offenses for unique and 'special' treatment").
72. See Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 296' (discussing the fact that evidence of sexual
misconduct or child molestation has an extraordinary tendency to generate hostility towards the
accused among jurors); Pickett, supra note 23, at 900-01 (arguing that sex offenders are held in
such widespread contempt that juries may punish defendants based on prior bad acts disregarding
other evidence).
73. The threat to due process created by the prejudicial effect of Rules 413-415 was
specifically anticipated by the ABA Criminal Justice Section prior to enactment of the new rules.
Prejudice can result from overestimating the probative value of character evidence,
or punishing the accused for past conduct or other crimes the defendant may have
committed or will commit. Obviously, the prejudice of such acts is great....
[Jurors] may not care if sufficient evidence of guilt exists because they feel less
responsibility for convicting an individual who they know has committed previous
bad acts. Ultimately, the jury may reach its verdict without deciding the defen-
dant's guilt in the present case.
ABA Report, supra note 9, at 349; see also Natali & Stigall, supra note 12, at 34-35 (stating that
several courts of appeal have held that Rules 413-415 directly contravene the Due Process
Clause).
74. See Duane, supra note 30, at 109 (discussing the fact that under Rules 413-415
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crime.76 Thus, individuals accused of sex offenses face a greater
likelihood that their constitutional rights will be denied by jurors who:
(1) overestimate the probative value of prior allegations and evidence;77
(2) seek to punish the accused for presumed past conduct;78 or (3)
decide to protect society from the defendant's presumed future criminal
conduct.79 The prejudicial power of such testimony is so great that it
may impede jurors' efforts to dispassionately evaluate the evidence in
the instant case.8" Rules 413-415 threaten the accuracy and integrity of
"antagonistic accusers with stale, uncertain, and possibly false allegations can easily come out
of the woodwork after it becomes widely known that an accused rapist is heading for trial"); see
also Pickett, supra note 23, at 886 ('The prohibition against using uncharged-misconduct
evidence to prove propensity exists because much uncharged-misconduct evidence is only
weakly relevant to the issue of a defendant's action at a later date.").
75. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing the admission of remote
uncharged and unrelated allegations or evidence under Rules 413-415).
76. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 29, at 160-61, 178-79 (citing research that has
shown that admission of a defendant's prior bad acts significantly increases the chance that a
jury will convict a defendant).
77. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the dangers of exposing the jury to an
accused's prior offenses. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948)
(evidence of a "defendant's prior trouble with the law, [or] specific criminal acts" is
inadmissible because it will "weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to
prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge").
78. See Duane, supra note 30, at 110 (discussing the likelihood that defendants will be
prejudiced by Rules 413-415 because jurors will be inclined to convict based on their
disapproval of past crimes or suspicion that the defendant has committed other uncharged
crimes, even without a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); see also David P. Bryden
& Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 565
(1989) (stating that jurors who are presented with evidence to show propensity are more likely
to convict a defendant because of who he is rather than what he did and may pay less attention
to gaps or inconsistencies in the non-propensity evidence).
79. One commentator has noted that
even if [jurors] do not conclude that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, [jurors] will be inclined to convict him (at least in part)
on the basis of their disapproval of his prior crimes, or their hunch that he has
committed other crimes for which he was never caught, or their fear of letting him
remain in the streets to commit future crimes.
See Duane, supra note 30, at 110 (discussing the likely effect of Rules 413-415 on jurors).
80. See Natali & Stigall, supra note 12, at 11 nn.69-71 (citing cases that support the
proposition that evidence of prior bad acts is prejudicial because it jeopardizes the constitutional-
ly mandated presumption of innocence); Anne E. Kyl, Note, The Propriety of Propensity: The
Effects and Operation of New Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 659,
660-61 (1995) (stating that evidence admitted under the new rules "may allow judges and juries
to make inferences of guilt based not only on the evidence of the specific crime with which a
defendant is charged but on his past misdeeds as well").
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our judicial system by increasing the probability of the most unjust
scenario-increasing the rate of conviction of innocent defendants."
However, the federal courts have not interpreted Rules 413-415 to
guarantee the admission of all allegations and evidence of prior sexual
offense in all cases. In fact, the first few judicial decisions interpreting
Rules 413-415 reveal that judges have been reluctant to disregard the
prejudice concerns of Rule 403,"2 particularly when they conclude that
a defendant's prior offenses are not sufficiently similar to the current
charge.83
1. The Federal Appellate Courts Interpret Rules 413-415
On April 30, 1997, the Second Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to address the application of Rule 414.4 In United
81. The probability that Rules 413-415 would increase convictions among both the
innocent and the guilty was specifically anticipated by some legal commentators prior to the
enactment of the new rules:
The legislative history of the new rules contains no acknowledgment of the
undeniable fact that they can possibly lead to additional convictions only in the
case of those defendants who (1) are acquitted under current law, and (2) have
some sort of alleged history of sexual assault.... The answer to that crucial
question-which was barely even mentioned in the Congressional debates leading
to the passage of the rules-depends entirely on one's assumptions about the
group of accused sex offenders who are acquitted under current law but have a
suspect background: how many of them are innocent, and how many are guilty?
Even if only 10% of that group are actually innocent, increasing the chances of
convicting them all runs afoul of our society's fundamental constitutional value
determination "that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free."
See Duane, supra note 30, at 108 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985))
(emphasis added).
82. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EviD. R. 403.
83. See infra notes 101 & 103. The recent judicial interpretations of Rules 413-415,
discussed in Pt. B.1.2., alleviate some of the previously articulated concerns regarding the
possible limiting effects of the new rules on existing Rule 403. See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra
note 12, at 30 ("By mandating that prior acts evidence is admissible, the rules prohibit a district
court from balancing the probativeness and prejudice of such evidence as permitted in Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence."); see also Livnah, supra note 7, at 177 (discussing the fact
that the new rules will minimize the impact of Rule 403 because the "drafters believed that...
prejudice was not a real concern").
84. The first federal appellate court to mention Rules 413-415 was the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. On July 8, 1996, in the case of United States v. Roberts, 88 F3d 872, 875
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States v. Larson,5 the defendant appealed his conviction for interstate
transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual
conduct.86 The appeal was based on the admission, under Rules 413
and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of testimony regarding
uncharged sex offenses that had allegedly occurred as much as sixteen
to twenty years prior to trial. 7
On appeal, Judge Kearse of the Second Circuit considered the
application of both Rules 40388 and 404(b)89 to evidence otherwise
admissible under the new evidentiary rule, Rule 414. 0 According to the
Second Circuit:
The extent to which the court may exclude proper Rule 414
evidence as a result of a Rule 403 balancing analysis has
not previously been addressed by this Court. [However,]
[t]he sponsors of... Rule 414 noted that, in contrast to
Rule 404(b), Rule 414 permits evidence of other instances
of child molestation as proof of, inter alia, a "propensity"
of the defendant to commit child molestation offens-
es .... 91
Judge Kearse then considered all of the grounds for admissibility
described in Rule 404(b).92 After engaging in this analysis, Judge
(10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Rule 413 was inapplicable
because the indictment had been filed before the rule's effective date. However, Roberts
contained a brief discussion of Rule 413. According to the Tenth Circuit, Rule 413
will supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). In contrast to Rule 404(b)'s general prohibition of evidence of
character or propensity, the new rules for sex offense cases authorize admission and
consideration of evidence of an uncharged offense for its bearing "on any matter
to which it is relevant."
Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
85. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
86. See id. at 602.
87. See id. The trial court concluded that the testimony regarding the prior uncharged sex
offenses was admissible under Rule 413 and under Rule 404(b) to show intent. See id. However,
the court excluded, without explanation, other testimony regarding prior sex offenses that had
allegedly occurred 21-23 years before the trial. See id.
88. See id. at 604-05; supra note 82 (quoting text of Rule 403).
89. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 604; see also supra note 62 (quoting the text of Rule 404(b)).
90. See Larson, 112 F3d at 604-05.
91. Id. at 604.
92. See id. at 604-05. Most state and federal case law interpret Rule 404(b) to allow
evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts if the prosecutor can show a nexus to any goal other
than simply proving that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes. See supra note 62
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Kearse concluded that the district court had properly applied a Rule 403
analysis of probity and prejudice to the evidence admitted under Rule
414.93
Thus, United States v. Larson is the first federal appellate court
decision stating that Rule 414 does not require judges to abandon Rule
403 considerations of "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 94 In fact, Judge
Kearse specifically emphasized the limiting role of Rule 403 when he
stated that "[w]e view Rule 403 analysis in connection with evidence
offered under Rule 414 to be consistent with Congress's intent as
reflected in the legislative history.....,9'
At the same time, the Larson court declined the opportunity to
interpret Rule 413 as imposing any particular standard of proof on
evidence admitted under the new rule. The court applied the same broad
interpretation of Rule 413 to the question of the recency of potentially
admissible evidence.96 According to the Second Circuit, "[n]o time
limit is imposed on the uncharged offenses for which evidence may be
admitted; as a practical matter, evidence of other sex offenses by the
defendant is often probative and properly admitted, notwithstanding
substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or offens-
es. 97
Only three months later, on July 10, 1997, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeal first confronted the application of Rule 413.98 In United
States v. Sumner, the defendant, who lived on Red Lake Indian
reservation in Minnesota,99 was charged with touching the genitals of
the underage victim "D.D." on two occasions."° A jury found him
guilty and the court sentenced him to 210 months in prison."
On appeal, Sumner argued that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of one conviction and one uncharged allegation of sexual
(quoting the text of Rule 404(b)); see also ABA Report, supra note 9, at 348 (arguing that prior
acts that tend to show anything other than propensity are admissible under Rule 404(b)).
93. See Larson, 112 F3d at 605.
94. See id.; supra note 82 (providing text of FED. R. EVID. 403).
95. Larson, 112 F.3d at 604-05.
96. See id. at 605.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Sumner, 119 3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997).
99. See id at 660. Various commentators have noted that Rules 413-415 will have a
disproportionate impact on Native Americans because sexual assault or child molestation is only
a federal offense if it occurs on Native American land or federal property. See, e.g., ABA Report,
supra note 9, at 352; Duane, supra note 30, at 113-15.
100. See Sumner, 119 F.3d at 660.
101. See id.
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assault on girls under the age of fourteen."° The trial court had denied
the government's proffer of this evidence under Rule 414, stating that
the new evidentiary rule was unconstitutional because it allowed the
admission of " 'any kind of evidence to show propensity [to commit
criminal acts] without allowing for the application of the Rule 403
balancing test.' ""03 However, the trial court admitted evidence of the
charged and uncharged sexual assaults under Rule 404(b) after the
government successfully argued that this evidence was relevant to show
intent. 0' 4
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred
when it admitted evidence of the prior sexual assaults to prove
Sumner's intent." According to Circuit Court Judge Wollman, intent
is not at issue when the defendant denies only the criminal act and
makes no specific denial of the intent element."° The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeal further concluded that the alleged and charged "abuse
of the two other children [was] not sufficiently similar to [Sumner's]
alleged abuse of D.D. to be relevant for showing opportunity, planning,
or preparation. ' ' "W According to the court, this evidence was inadmissi-
ble because it did nothing "more than show that Sumner [had] 'a
propensity to commit crimes, which Rule 404(b) prohibits.' ""'
Finally, the Sumner court concluded that the district court erred when
it found that Rule 414 was unconstitutional." According to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeal, the trial court was incorrect in its assumption
102. See id.
103. See id. at 661.
104. See id. at 660.
105. See id. at 661.
106. See id. at 660. At trial, Sumner defended himself by specifically denying that the
alleged acts of abuse had occurred. See id. Sumner did not introduce any evidence regarding
intent, and his attorney's opening statement and closing argument reflected his theory that the
acts did not occur. See id. In the alternative, Sumner had offered to stipulate to the intent
element, provided that the trial court preclude testimony regarding the two prior incidents. See
id. Under these circumstances, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that "[i]f the defendant
decides with 'sufficient clarity' to mount a defense that consists 'solely of a denial of the
criminal act rather than a denial of the criminal intent, Rule 404(b) evidence on the issue of
intent is not admissible." Id.
107. See id. at 661. The fundamental requirement of all admissible evidence is relevancy,
regardless of its source or nature. See FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by... these rules.... [e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."). Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
108. See Swnner, 119 F3d at 661.
109. See id.
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that Rule 414 negates the application of Rule 403. Thus, Judge Wollman
concluded:
Rule 414 states that evidence of other offenses "is admissi-
ble." This same language is used in Federal Rule of
Evidence 402, ("[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible") and
is similar to the language used in 404(b) ("may ... be
admissible"). Evidence admitted under both these rules is
subject to Rule 403 .... It is logical that Rule 403 applies
to Rule 414 as well, and nothing in the language of Rule
414 precludes the application of Rule 403.110
In Sumner, the Eighth Circuit, like the Second Circuit in Larson,
concluded that Rules 413 and 414 may be limited by Rule 403.
However, by falling to establish a standard of proof or impose any type
of "reasonableness" requirement on the recency of admissible evidence,
the federal appellate courts have opened the door to the use of outdated,
uncharged, and unsupported allegations against sex offenders that would
be precluded if the defendant had been charged with any other crime.
2. The District Courts Interpret Rules 413-415
Three published district court opinions also have considered the
application of Rules 413-415. These decisions offer additional guidance
on the question of how these new rules should be reconciled with
existing evidentiary rules.'
In July 1996, in the case of Frank v. County of Hudson,"' a New
Jersey district court concluded that prior uncharged allegations of sexual
assault were inadmissible under Rules 413, 415, and 403 in ordinary
sexual harassment and discrimination lawsuits."' The court began its
110. Id. at 661-62 (citations omitted).
111. In addition to the district court cases discussed in this Part, in July 1996, an Oregon
district court briefly addressed the admissibility of uncharged allegations of sex offenses under
Rules 404(b) and Rule 413. See United States v. Jackson, No. 95-388, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11267, at *3 (D. Or. July 22, 1996). The allegations at issue in Jackson included testimony
regarding a 1990 incident that had occurred when the defendant was 17-years-old. See id. After
considering the application of both Rule 404(b) and Rule 413, the Jackson court found that
testimony regarding the 1990 incident was inadmissible because the alleged incident was not
sufficiently similar to the instant case to be relevant to the issue of consent. See id. at *9-*10.
112. 924 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1996).
113. See id. at 625. The Frank court stated that the specific facts at issue opened the door
to admission of the prior uncharged allegations. See id. According to the court, although "the
ordinary sexual harassment or discrimination case will not justify the admission of evidence of
prior sexual assaults, in this case plaintiffs have alleged assaultive behavior rather than mere
verbal abuse or discriminatory treatment." Id.
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analysis of the interrelationship between these evidentiary rules by
finding that evidence proffered under Rules 413-415 "must still be
shown to be relevant, probative and 'legally relevant' under FRE 403"
in order to be admissible."" The Frank court narrowly interpreted the
scope of Rules 413 and 415. Using the Rule 403 test, the court
concluded that although the prior allegations were "relevant on the
subject of [the defendant's] propensity to commit sexual assaults,' 15
they had minimal probative value." 6 The court then held .that "[t]his
low degree of probative value stacks up weakly against the statement's
large potential for unfair prejudice.""..7 The Frank court supported this
conclusion by citing the "unique stigma" that is carried by child sexual
abuse."' Finally, the court noted that, based on the specific facts at
issue, "this is not the classic sort of case for which FRE 415 was
enacted."" 9
In November 1996, in the case of Cleveland v. KFC National
Management Co., W a federal district court for the northern district of
Georgia addressed the question of whether allegations of sexual
misconduct are admissible under Rule 415 in a civil sexual harassment
lawsuit.'' This court specifically considered the interrelationship
between Rule 415 and Rule 403. According to the court, "[s]ince Rule
403 operates in concert with Rule 415, it is proper for the undersigned
to weigh the probative value against the prejudiciality of evidence that
would otherwise be admissible under Rule 415."'" The court also
stated that because the defendant was a corporate entity, "Rule 415 is
tempered by Rule 403 [and] evidence of a defendant's agent's
misconduct must be both probative in that it proves corporate knowledge
of similar misconduct and it must corroborate plaintiff's story;
otherwise, the prejudicial effect on the jury is not substantially out-
weighed."'"
The most recent federal district court case to address the new
evidentiary rules, United States v. Guardia,'24 contains a detailed
114. Id. at 624.
115. See id. at 626.
116. See id. at 627.
117. Id. at 626.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 627. According to the court, the inherent difficulties of proof that Rule 415 was
designed to overcome do not exist when there are multiple plaintiffs who support each other's
claims. See id.
120. 948 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
121. See id. at 62.
122. See id. at 66 (citing Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996)).
123. Id.
124. 955 F Supp. 115 (D. N.M. 1997).
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analysis of Rule 413. This case involved a criminal complaint against
Dr. Guardia, a gynecologist at Kirkland Air Force Base, by Carla G., a
patient." During discovery, the prosecutors learned of several other
women who had complained about Dr. Guardia's sexual advances and
sought to subpoena these women to testify at trial." In response, the
defense then filed a motion in limine to preclude the admission of
uncharged allegations under Rules 403, 404(b), or 413.127
The district court began its analysis by recognizing that there has
been "debate on whether and how... Rules [413-415] would be
construed in conjunction with Rules 403 and 404.' ' 2' After summariz-
ing the debate, the court concluded that "[a] common sense reading of
Rule 403 ... indicates that since it applies only to evidence otherwise
admissible, it applies to evidence otherwise admissible under Rule
413.,,129 However, the court also found that "Congress... intended
Rule 413 to reverse the presumption against prior bad acts found in Rule
404(b) and this is likely to result in less evidence being excluded under
the balancing test of Rule 403.1'13
After presenting its analysis of Rule 413, the court used its power
under Rule 403 to limit "undue delay" and "waste of time" to exclude
the proffered testimony:
This Court, however, has been unable to find any congres-
sional history or legal authority to support the premise that
Rule 413 is intended to substantially lengthen trials or
require additional expert testimony.... [T]his Court is
persuaded that the additional four witnesses the Government
proposes to call under Rule 413 add little probative value
to the testimony of the two prosecuting witnesses but have
the definite potential to confuse the jury and unnecessarily
extend the trial.
13 1
The court also stated that the proffered testimony should be excluded
"[b]ecause: the jury must first find that the defendant committed the
uncharged crimes before it can use them as evidence of the charged
crime, [therefore] the trial of a single offense can be converted into two,
three, four, or more trials....
125. See id. at 117.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 116.
128. See id. at 117.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 118.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 119 (quoting 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
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Thus, the district courts that have examined Rules 413-415, like the
appellate courts discussed in the previous section, have used Rule 403
to narrow the scope of the new rules. However, some federal courts
have, at the same time, broadly interpreted the new rules by: (1)
accepting that Congress intended Rules 413-415 to reverse the presump-
tion against prior bad acts found in Rule 404(b);13 (2) declining the
opportunity to establish a reasonable standard of proof for potentially
admissible evidence; (3) concluding that under Rules 413-415 "[n]o time
limit is imposed on the unchallenged offenses for which evidence may
be admitted; M and (4) permitting the use of otherwise inadmissible
propensity evidence.
II. SEXUAL PREDATOR CONFINEMENT STATUTES: KEEPING THE
SEXUAL PREDATOR OFF THE STREETS
A. The Historical Development of Laws Requiring the
Involuntary Commitment of Sexual Predators
The United States has a long history of state laws requiring that sex
offenders be involuntarily and indefinitely confined in mental health
facilities. 35 Most of the early "sexual psychopath" statutes were enacted
from the 1930s to the 1960s. 36 During this time, over half of the
states had laws permitting the involuntary civil commitment and
psychiatric treatment of "sexual psychopaths.' 3 7 These laws treated
sexual psychopathology as a mental disease or defect and required that
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5412, at 264 (Supp. 1996)).
133. See Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 (N.D. Ga.
1996); see also I STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 577-
78 (1995).
134. Larson, 112 .3d at 605.
135. See Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators in Kansas: A Modem Law for Modem Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 888-89
(1994).
136. See John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate
Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 659-60
(1992) (stating that over half of the states had "sexual psychopath statutes" by the late 1960s).
Public outrage and fear of sex crimes, particularly crimes against children, were a motivating
forces in the passage of these early sexual psychopath laws. See Blacher, supra note 1, at 896.
137. See La Fond, supra note 136, at 660; see also Blacher, supra note 1, at 903 ("By
1960, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia enacted some version of a sexually
dangerous person statute."). But see Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Leroy Hendricks, at *21 n.17, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072
(1997), (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075) (discussing the fact that sexual psychopath statutes "were not
put to wide-spread use (except in California)") [hereinafter American Psychiatric Association
Brief].
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a psychiatrist make decisions regarding diagnosis, treatment, and
release.' Under the sexual psychopath statutes, convicted sex offend-
ers were removed from the prison system and sentenced instead to
mental health facilities for rehabilitative treatment. 39 Thus, the sexual
psychopath laws represent early efforts to define when a state may
deprive a person of liberty because he has committed a sex offense
without providing the constitutional safeguards (for example, double
jeopardy and ex post facto prohibitions, and the right to a jury trial) of
the criminal law.
During the 1970s and 1980s legislators perceived that public opinion
was shifting away from treatment arid rehabilitation of sex offenders
towards punishment and retribution; in response, many states repealed
their sexual psychopath statutes.' 4 Other factors influencing the re-
examination of sexual psychopath laws included "the recognition that
not all violent sexual offenders were likely to respond to the same type
of therapy; the growing awareness that sex offenders were not mentally
ill; the lack of proven treatment methods to reduce recidivism rates; and
the rising concern for civil rights.' 14' By 1990, half of the states had
repealed their sexual psychopath statutes 42 and, of the remaining
states, only five have actively enforced their laws. 43 Thus, individuals
who previously had been confined to psychiatric hospitals were now
incarcerated in state penitentiaries.
Recently, a new type of statute has been developed to deal with the
sex offender. 44 Modem "sexual predator" laws differ from the earlier
138. See Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 543, 544 (1950).
139. See Annotation, Statutes Relating to Sexual Psychopaths, 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 351
(1967).
140. See Brian G. Bodine, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System: An Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
105, 105 (1990); Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator
Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 Hous. L. REV. 775, 777
n.5; McCaffrey, supra note 135, at 889.
141. Blacher, supra note 1, at 906.
142. See Bodine, supra note 140, at 107 n.27 (listing 12 states and the District of Columbia
having sexual offender commitment laws in effect in 1990); Blacher, supra note 1, at 906.
143. See Blacher, supra note 1, at 906-07.
144. The first of the new sexual predator statutes was enacted in Washington state
following extensive community protests over a series of well-publicized sex offenses. See
Bochnewich, supra note 9, at 280 (the Washington Sexually Violent Predator Statute was the
legislature's response to "a firestorm of community shock and outrage over a string of
continuing violent sex crimes in Washington"); Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional
Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process
Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 611 (1997) ("Washington's legislature enacted the Sexually
Violent Predator Act in response to the 1989 attack of a Washington boy by a repeat sexual
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"sexual psychopath" statutes. Most significantly, instead of replacing
prison with civil confinement, the new laws permit states to continue to
confine sexual predators for an indefinite time after he has served his
full prison sentence.'45 Under the majority of the existing sexual
predator confinement statutes, on a prisoner's scheduled release
date,"4 instead of leaving prison, he will simply be transferred to a
high-security mental health treatment center located within the state
penal system. 47
On June 23, 1997, in Kansas v. Hendricks,4 ' the Supreme Court
upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. The Kansas statute,
like most of the new sex offender confinement statutes, was modeled
after the Washington Sexually Violent Predator Act.'49 The Kansas Act
defines a "sexually violent predator" as, "any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence."'"
This statute is designed to apply to individuals who demonstrate a
"mental abnormality or personality disorder,'. 5' but do not suffer from
offender, Earl Kenneth Shriner, whose criminal history dated back to 1966.") (citations omitted).
145. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2901 to -2941 (West 1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§
33-6-301 to -505 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.06.005 to .270
(West 1992).
146. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (West 1994) (providing for initiation of
confinement procedures only for prisoners nearing release).
147. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (West 1994) (authorizing "civil" confinement by
prison authorities if sexual predators are housed and managed separately from the general prison
population); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(3) (West 1992) ('The facility shall not be
located ... [at] any state mental facility or regional habilitation center because these institutions
are insufficiently secure for this population."); see also Gleb, supra note 8, at 216 (describing
how, under the Washington statute, sexual predators will be confined in "small prison-like
treatment center[s] within the walls of the state prison... under high-security conditions," in
cells identical to all other prison inmates).
148. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
149. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.06.005 to .120 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). It should
be noted that in Young v. Weston, 898 R Supp. 744, 754 (W.D. Wash. 1995), the district court
struck down Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute. However, the overall precedential
value of the Young decision may be questioned in light of Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2072.
150. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1994). This definition of the psychological
criteria for determining who is a "sexually violent predator" matches, almost exactly, the
relevant section of the Washington Sexually Violent Predator Statute. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1997).
151. "Mental abnormality" is defined under the Act as "a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses." See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 1994). It should be noted that in
Young v. Weston, 898 F Supp. 744, 750 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 1995), the district court stated that
the term "mental abnormality" contained in the state's sex offender confinement statute has
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a "mental illness." Individuals who have a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" can be involuntarily confined as sexual preda-
tors,' despite the fact that they are not mentally ill and, therefore,
could not be civilly committed under the Kansas general involuntary
commitment statute.'
Under the Kansas statute, civil commitment procedures may be
initiated against: (1) a presently confined person who "has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense" and is scheduled for release; (2)
a person who has been "charged with a sexually violent offense and
who has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial;" or (3) a
person who has been found "not guilty by reason of insanity of a
sexually violent offense.' ' "M Following a judicial determination that a
person is a "sexually violent predator,"155 Kansas requires continued
confinement "until such time as the person's mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at
large."156 As of today, nineteen jurisdictions have sexual predator
"neither a clinically significant meaning nor a recognized diagnostic use," is 'unrecognized in
the psychiatric community," and is of "no value to treatment professionals." But see Brief of the
Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
*3-11, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (arguing that "mental
abnormality" has meaning to mental health experts and is consistent with the diagnostic process
and nomenclature of other psychiatric diagnoses) [hereinafter Brief of the Association for the
Treatment of Sexual Abusers]; supra note 149 (questioning precedential value of this case).
152. State prosecutors generally will attempt to satisfy the burden of proving the requisite
"mental abnormality or personality disorder" and propensity to commit future "predatory acts
of sexual violence" through testimony regarding prior sex offenses and the expert opinions of
mental health professionals. However, the use of scientific or medical testimony to interpret past
sexual offenses suggests a degree of precision and accuracy that is unsupported by the empirical
data. See infra pt. III.A.-C. (discussing the fact that mental health professionals cannot make
reliable predictions based on empirical evidence regarding future violence, recidivism, or
criminal specialization); see also Eric S. Janus, The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex
Offender Commitment, 23 NEw ENGLAND J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 347, 361 (1997)
("The systematic integration of science in the language and operation of sex offender
commitment statutes is the central prop in their claim for constitutional and policy legitimacy.").
153. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1994).
154. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (West 1994).
155. Under the Kansas Act, if state officials charged with the custody of sex offenders think
that an inmate may meet the sexually violent predator standard, they are required to notify the
Kansas Attorney General, who will determine whether the standard has been satisfied. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (West 1994). The Attorney General may then file a petition alleging that
the person is a sexually violent predator. See id. § 59-29a04. If the court finds probable cause,
the inmate is confined in a secure facility for evaluation. See id. § 59-29a05. A trial is then held
in which the prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the individual is a sexually
violent predator. See id. §§ 59-29a06 & 59-29a07.
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (West 1994). The statute further requires that the
confined sexually violent predator be given "care and treatment" that "conform to constitutional
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confinement statutes."5 However, immediately following the Supreme
Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, legislators from additional
states began to propose similar legislation. 58
requirements," and an annual status review. See id. §§ 59-29a08 & 59-29a09. However, in light
of the fact that the Kansas Act specifically states that sexually violent predators are "unamenable
to existing mental illness treatment," id. § 59-29a01, the treatment requirement appears irrelevant
and disingenuous. See Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental
Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, I PSYCH. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 161, 168 (1995) ("Neither the statutes nor the courts adequately explain, however,
the nature of the impairment thought to render these defendants appropriate for commitment but
not amenable to ordinary treatment."); see also infra notes 213-24 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance of treatment to the Supreme Court's analysis in Hendricks).
157. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4601 to -4613 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6250 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (1986
& Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-566 to -567 (West 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§
22-3501 to -3511 (West 1981 & Supp. 1997); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 205/1.01 to /12 (West
1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1 to .12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-
29a01 to -29a15 (West 1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1-9 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to -505 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-2922 to -2936 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to 2C:47-8 (West 1995 & Supp.
1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-1 (Michie 1993) (regarding "dangerous criminals"); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 426.510 to .680 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to -305 (1984 & Supp. 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to -5 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to -302 (Michie
1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.06.005 to .270 (West 1992); WIs. STAT. § 980.01 (West
1985 & Supp. 1996). In addition, the legislatures in Arkansas, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South
Carolina are considering adopting sexual predator statutes modeled on the Washington law. See
18th Ark. Leg., 2d Sess. (Ark. 1994); H.R. 396, 120th Ohio Gen. Ass., 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Ohio
1993); H.R. 8350, R.I. Reg. Sess. (R.I. 1994); H.R. 3193, 1993 S.C. Statewide Sess. (S.C. 1993).
158. See, e.g., Jodi Cohens, Plan Would Delay Release for Sex Offenders, DETROIT NEWs,
July 4, 1997, at A13 (discussing proposed Michigan statute modeled on the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Law); Michael Quinlan, Some Kentucky Lawmakers Seek Similar Bill, THE
COURRIER-JOURNAL, June 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6643069 (discussing proposed
Kentucky statute modeled on the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Law); Sex Predator
Legislation, PA. L. WEEKLY, Sept. 8, 1997, at 8 (discussing proposed Pennsylvania statute
modeled on the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Law). In addition, while Kansas v. Hendricks
was pending before the Supreme Court, 39 states filed a joint amicus brief in support of Kansas.
See Brief of the States of Washington, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming, the Commonwealths of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Virginia
and Puerto Rico, The District of Columbia, the Territories of American Samoa and Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
B. Kansas v. Hendricks: The Supreme Court Upholds a
Sexual Predator Confinement Statute
1. Background
On June 23, 1997, Justice Thomas, writing for a five-Justice majority
that included Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy,
delivered the opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks.'59 This landmark
decision dramatically expanded a state's right to indefinitely confine
those individuals that it has deemed sexual predators. Most significantly,
Justice Thomas rejected the long-standing requirement that a person
must suffer from a "mental illness"'' before the state can initiate
involuntary civil confinement procedures against him.
Justice Thomas began his opinion by reviewing the most significant
aspects of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. 6' Under the Act,
Kansas defined a "sexually violent predator" as: " 'any person who has
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence.' "162 A "mental abnormality" is defined as a " 'congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of oth-
ers.' "163 The Kansas statute applies to: (1) inmates convicted of a
159. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076.
160. A "legal mental illness" has been defined as a "psychological impairment that
undermines" an individual's capacity to direct his conduct through the process of practical
reasoning and prevents him from guiding his conduct according to the rules available to the
ordinary practical reasoner. See Schopp, supra note 156, at 179.
161. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076-78.
162. Id. at 2077 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1994)). Kansas has argued
that the use of the terms "mental abnormality" and "personality disorder" do not substantively
change the civil commitment schemes that have been upheld by the Supreme Court in the past.
However, this claim has been disputed by the National Mental Health Association:
mhe Kansas statute strikes at the very heart of that system by failing to require
a finding of mental illness to support commitment .... If Kansas were correct in
asserting that the Act imposes no substantive change in the definition of mental
illness, there would have been no need to enact it. The director of corrections could
simply have instituted civil commitment proceedings against all those who were
a danger to others as a result of a diagnosed mental illness.
Brief for the National Mental Health Association, supra note 34, at *9.
163. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 1994)).
A "mental abnormality" differs significantly from the type of "mental illness" traditionally
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sexually violent offense and scheduled for release; (2) defendants
charged with a sexually violent offense and found incompetent to stand
trial; (3) defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity; and (4)
defendants found not guilty because of a mental disease or defect."
Justice Thomas concluded his discussion of the Kansas Act by outlining
its procedural safeguards and avenues of review.65
Justice Thomas then focused on Leroy Hendrick's criminal history.
In 1984, Hendricks had been convicted of taking "indecent liberties"
with two thirteen year-old boys." By 1994, Hendricks had almost
finished serving his prison sentence and was scheduled to be released
to a halfway house that September. Shortly before his release date,
Kansas filed a petition seeking to continue to confine Hendricks as a
"sexually violent predator."'" This was the first attempt by the state
to enforce its new Sexually Violent Predator Act.
In accordance with the Kansas Act, Hendricks requested a jury trial
on the question of his status as a sexually violent predator.69 During
that trial, the jury heard testimony that included a 39-year-old plea
agreement to indecent exposure, a 37-year-old conviction for lewdness,
a 34-year-old conviction for molestation, and a 31-year-old conviction
for sexual assault. 7 The court also heard testimony regarding un-
charged sexual abuse that had allegedly occurred 22 years earlier.
Kansas' chief psychologist testified that although Hendricks was a
pedophile, he was not mentally ill.'
Hendricks offered testimony from psychiatrist Dr. William S. Logan
who stated that it is impossible to accurately predict the "future
required for involuntary civil commitment. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the legal and scientific distinctions between the two terms).
164. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (West
1994)).
165. See id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06 to 59-29all (West 1994)).





171. See American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 138, at *8 ("Hendricks
evidently suffers from no incompetence to care for himself or to make rational decisions; and
his risk of committing another sex offense is precisely that, a risk."). Kansas also presented
testimony from a clinical social worker, Lester Lee, and the chief psychologist at Lamed State
Hospital, Dr. Charles Befort. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079, n.2. Lee testified that Hendricks had
a "personality trait disturbance," a "passive aggressive personality," and pedophilia. See id. Dr.
Befort testified that Hendricks suffered from pedophilia, a " 'menal abnormality' " and was
"likely to commit sex offenses against children in the future if not c-onfined." See id.
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dangerousness of a sex offender." 72 Hendricks testified on his own
behalf. Although Hendricks never stated that he would reoffend if he
was released from prison, he told the court that when he is "stressed
out" he is unable to control his urge to engage in sexual abuse. 73
Based upon this evidence, the trial court determined that, as a matter of
Kansas law, Hendricks suffered from pedophilia and that pedophilia
qualified as a "mental abnormality" as defined by the Act.74 Kansas
then committed Hendricks to the custody of the state until he could
prove that he was not a danger to himself or others.
Hendricks appealed his confinement decision to the Kansas Supreme
Court claiming violations of the "Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex
Post Facto Clauses" of the Federal Constitution.'76 On March 1, 1996,
that court found that Hendricks' due process rights had been violat-
ed."7 The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that substantive due
process requires that, before an individual may be involuntarily
committed, a state must prove that "the person is both (1) mentally ill;
and (2) a danger to himself or others."'7 According to the Kansas
Supreme Court, because a "mental abnormality" is not a "mental
illness," Kansas failed to meet the first prong of this test.'79
2. Legal Analysis
Justice Thomas began his analysis of the legal questions posed in this
case by stating that the "mental abnormality" requirement of the Act
satisfies substantive due process standards for the indefinite civil
confinement of individuals who are not mentally ill.' According to
the Court, "[ilt ... cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement
of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understand-
ing of ordered liberty."'81 To support this conclusion, Justice Thomas
relied primarily on the recent case of Foucha v. Louisiana,12 and a
172. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079 n.2 (citing the record on appeal).
173. See American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *4.
174. See id. at *5.
175. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
176. See id.
177. See id. (quoting In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996)).
178. See id. (quoting Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 137). The Kansas Supreme Court "did not
address Hendricks' ex post facto or double jeopardy claims." See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 2080.
182. See id. at 2079-80 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)). It should be noted
that Justice Thomas dissented in Foucha, sharply criticizing the majority for failing to identify
the fundamental right at issue or the appropriate standard of review. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at
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turn-of-the-last-century case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts."' A brief
review of these cases shows that the Court's analysis ignores significant
distinctions between these cases and the central issues in Hendricks.
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court explored a Louisiana
statute that permitted the state to confine defendants, who had been
deemed "dangerous," to mental institutions after they had been acquitted
by reason of insanity."' The defendant, Terry Foucha, was found not
guilty by reason of insanity of the crimes of aggravated burglary and
illegal discharge of a firearm.' The record shows that Foucha was not
diagnosed with any mental illness but was determined to have an
Antisocial Personality Disorder, not amenable to treatment.8 6 Follow-
ing the verdict, Foucha was committed to a state psychiatric hospi-
tal. 87 This post-acquittal confinement was for an indefinite term, and
Foucha could not be released until he could prove that he was not a
danger to himself or others.'
Justice White, writing for a plurality of the Court, struck down the
Louisiana law. At the core of Justice White's analysis was the
conclusion that "mental illness" is a constitutionally required element for
involuntary civil commitment.8 9 Justice White specifically stated that
116 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded that the Louisiana statute was
substantively reasonable. See id. at 123 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905)).
184. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 73.
185. See id. at 73-74.
186. See id. Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) is defined as a "pervasive pattern of
disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence
and continues into adulthood." See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV 645-46 (Michael B. First, M.D. ed.,
4th ed. 1994) (listing, among others, the following examples of behavior indicating APD: failure
to honor financial obligations, "destroying property, harassing others, stealing," having an illegal
occupation, physical fights, spouse and child abuse). In fact, the American Psychiatric
Association has expressly disavowed any predictive quality to an APD diagnosis stating that
classifying a person with APD "does not enhance the dubious reliability of a clinical prediction
that the person will repeat his or her crime." Gleb, supra note 8, at 230-31. This has lead some
mental health professionals to criticize APD as a diagnosis that is based solely on an assumed
predisposition to commit unlawful acts with little information regarding an individual's
psychological condition. See, e.g., Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and the DSM-JV Criteria
for Antisocial Personality Disorder, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 391, 391 (1991); Janus, supra
note 152, at 368 ("It is well established that seventy to eighty percent of all prisoners are
diagnosable with antisocial personality disorder...
187. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 74.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 77-78; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) ("[The
Due Process Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment proceeding to demonstrate
by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous."); Schopp,
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"keeping Foucha against his will in a mental institution is improper
absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings of current
mental illness and dangerousness." "9 Although the Court opined that
a state may constitutionally confine individuals who are both mentally
ill and dangerous, Louisiana did not prove or even claim that Foucha
was mentally ill. 9' Thus, Foucha stands for the proposition that
involuntary civil commitment requires a finding of mental illness and
cannot be based on predictions of dangerousness alone."
According to the Foucha Court, a state can never prevail by arguing
that its safety interests outweigh Foucha's liberty interest.'93 Instead,
the state must show "why its interests would not be vindicated by
the... normal means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct."'94
Thus, the Court found the Louisiana statute unconstitutional because the
omission of a mental illness requirement from the civil confinement
scheme violated the Due Process Clause. 95 Despite the clear holding
in Foucha, Justice Thomas relied on this case as precedent for its
supra note 156, at 167 (stating that individuals "fall within the jurisdiction of either the criminal
justice or mental health systems depending on the presence or absence of some type of mental
illness").
190. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78. This conclusion was even echoed in the dissent. See id. at
94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating'that it is "beyond question" that "in civil proceedings the
Due Process Clause requires the State to prove both insanity and dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence").
191. See id. at 80. In fact, the Court consistently criticized Louisiana for seeking "to
perpetuate Foucha's confinement... on the basis of his antisocial personality." See id, at 78.
192. Prior to Justice Thomas' recent reinterpretation of Foucha, this case was consistently
viewed by state supreme courts and legal scholars as requiring a finding of "mental illness" to
sustain an involuntary civil commitment. See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 n.5
(Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994). One court observed that
[i]n Foucha v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held that a Louisiana
civil commitment statute, which allowed a person acquitted by reason of insanity,
who had an antisocial personality disorder but no longer a mental illness, to remain
indefinitely committed to a mental hospital on the basis of dangerousness alone,
violated substantive due process.
Id. (citation omitted); see also James W. Ellis, Limits on the State's Power to Confine
"Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional Implications ofFoucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REv. 635, 647-48 (1992); Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled
Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 174-75 (1996).
193. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 83. Justice White also noted that, unlike crininal convicts, Foucha's
confinement was indefinite and his release conditioned on affirmative proof of his safety. See
id. at 85. This distinction led Justice White to conclude that the Louisiana statute also denied
Foucha equal protection of law. See id. at 84-85.
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antithesis-the conclusion in Hendricks that proof that the state may
mandate indefinite civil commitment without establishing that an
individual suffers from a mental illness.1"
The second case that Justice Thomas relied upon, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,97 upheld the right of a state to force its residents to
submit to vaccinations against smallpox in order to protect public
health.'98 The Jacobson case is commonly understood to stand for the
proposition that the state's interest in protecting the public can be
sufficient to support mandatory vaccination which is a type of civil
deprivation of liberty.' However, the Jacobson court did not address
the methods that a state may use to enforce public health regulations
and, therefore, did not reach the question of constitutionally acceptable
enforcement mechanisms.)' Thus, Jacobson does not speak to the
central question at issue in Hendricks-whether, or under what
circumstances, a state may use noncriminal procedures to deprive an
individual of liberty.
Having dispensed with the "mental illness" prong of the Foucha test,
Justice Thomas turned to Foucha's second require-
ment--"dangerousness." The Court first emphasized that "[t]he
challenged Act unambiguously requires a finding of dangerousness
either to one's self or to others as a prerequisite to involuntary
confinement." '' Justice Thomas then noted that "[a] finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon
which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment."2' Despite this
assertion, at the core of the Court's decision is Justice Thomas's
implicit acceptance of dangerousness alone as sufficient grounds for
commitment under the Kansas Act.
Justice Thomas's test for indefinite civil confinement under the
Kansas Act, on its face, appears to contain two requirements. According
to the Court, confinement is constitutional if there is: (1) "evidence of
past sexually violent behavior;" and (2) "a present mental condition that
196. This conclusion is also contradicted by the Supreme Court's more recent decision in
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1383 (1996) (noting that for civil commitment "due
process requires at a minimum a showing that the person is mentally ill").
197. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
198. See id. at 35.
199. See, e.g., Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal
Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 341 (1989).
200. The Jacobson case is further distinguishable from Hendricks. The Jacobson Court
dealt with the tangible public health threat of a smallpox epidemic, see Jacobson, 197 U.S. at
12, while Hendricks addressed the speculative danger posed by individuals who may, or may
not, commit a certain type of crime at some point in the future.
201. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
202. Id.
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creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future."2 3 However, close
examination of the Court's decision reveals that the state can satisfy
both prongs of the Hendricks test by presenting allegations of an
individual's past sex offenses which will establish his dangerousness.
The first prong of the Hendricks test requires nothing more than
"evidence" of past sex offenses. In the context of this case, the Court
found that this evidence can be comprised of allegations and judicial
dispositions that date back as far as forty years.2" The Court then
permitted the state to recycle these same allegations to satisfy the
second prong of the Hendricks test. According to Justice Thomas,
" '[p]revious instances of violent behavior are an important indicator of
future violent tendencies.' ,205 Using the Court's own analysis, a
history of violence satisfies the second prong of the test because it
indicates a "present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such
conduct in the future."' Thus, the apparent distinction between parts
one and two of Justice Thomas' test are immaterial because the same
allegations and evidence from an individual's remote past will satisfy
the first and second prongs of the Hendricks test.2 °
203. See id.
204. See id. at 2078 (referring to testimony by the defendant during trial that he had
"exposed his genitals to two young girls" in 1955).
205. Id. at 2080 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993)) (citations omitted); see
infra pt. III (discussing the inherent unreliability of future predictions of violence based on past
behavior and the lack of any reliable empirical evidence to support such inferences).
In the sex offender commitment cases, the courts have placed weight on the
requirement that there be some nexus between the mental disorder and the
violence. This nexus is said to exist when mental disorder "causes," "specifically
causes," "results in:' "predicts," or "explains" sexual violence. But courts have
never explained what any of these complex concepts means, and have apparently
never required anything more than conclusory expert opinions to support findings
on the nexus issue.
See Janus, supra note 152, at 384 (citations omitted).
206. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
207. The assumption that past violence proves an abnormal mental condition has been
directly contradicted by mental health experts. See, e.g., Brief for the National Mental Health
Association, supra note 34, at *7-8 ("Criminal behavior, including sexually violent behavior, is
more often the product of a failure of moral development, or insufficient impulse control, than
it is a result of mental illness."); Robert C. Boruchowitz, Sexual Predator Law-The Nightmare
in the Halls of Justice, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 827, 836 (1992) (stating that there is no
psychological knowledge that links sexual offending "with a mental disorder or that supports a
prediction that a given offender is more likely than not to reoffend violently"); Gleb, supra note
8, at 231-32 (discussing how judges and juries confronted with psychiatric testimony that a
person is a sexual predator will be given "the erroneous and prejudicial impression that the
person suffers from a condition that underwrites a prediction about his behavior").
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The Court's intention that sexual predator determinations be based
on predictions of future dangerousness alone is further illustrated by the
fact that the Kansas legislature and the Supreme Court: (1) made no
attempt to characterize or define the requisite "mental condition" or
"mental abnormality;"' (2) failed to describe the relationship between
this psychological assessment and the traditional civil commitment
requirement of "mental illness;"2' and (3) omitted any explanation of
how a "likelihood of such [sexually offensive] conduct in the future"'2 10
should be determined or evaluated. Finally, even assuming arguendo that
a reliable determination of future criminal behavior were possible,..
the Court gave no indication of how predictions of dangerousness should
factor into the balance between public safety and individual liberty.
Thus, the Court is willing to permit states to indefinitely confine
individuals who have committed one type of crime and have served their
full prison sentences, based solely on speculations regarding future
dangerousness, without any further guidance or empirical support.212
Finally, Justice Thomas asserted that the Kansas statute-which
contains no "mental illness" requirement and, on its face, states that it
is intended to reach individuals who do not satisfy the existing standards
for civil commitment-is "plainly' of a kind with... other civil
commitment statutes."2 3 This equation of sexual predator confinement
208. See Schopp, supra note 156, at 169 (describing sexual predator statutes as "particularly
problematic" because "[t]hey provide no explanation of the nature of the disorders supposedly
suffered by these offenders or of the manner in which the disorders render the offenders
dangerous"); Gleb, supra note 8, at 229 (describing the definition of a sexually violent predator
as "distort[ing] current psychiatric theory").
209. See supra note 208 (discussing the fact the "mental illness" has a precise meaning in
law and in science). In addition, none of the terms used by Justice Thomas in Hendricks,
("mental condition," "mental abnormality," and "mental disorder") is defined in the DSM-IV.
See DSM-IV, supra note 186, at 13-24.
210. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
211. But see supra pt. III.A. (describing how there is no reliable empirical evidence that
future dangerousness can be accurately predicted).
212. See American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at 17 ("Far from
providing an optional alternative to criminal remedies, the [Kansas Sexually Violent Predators]
Act improperly creates an essentially indefinite involuntary extension of criminal incarcera-
tion.").
213. See Hendricks, 117 S. CL at 2080. This conclusion is belied by the fact that the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act begins by acknowledging that it is intended to reach
individuals who would not fall within the standards that govern normal civil commitment under
Kansas laws. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 59-29a01 (West 1994). The general Kansas civil
commitment statute, unlike the Act at issue in Hendricks, requires that the individual eligible
for commitment not only have a "severe mental disorder to the extent that such person is in need
of treatment," and be "likely to cause harm to self or others," but also that the person lack the
capacity "to make an informed decision concerning treatment .... KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
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with civil confinement of the mentally ill raises significant legal and
policy issues and blurs the distinction between dangerous criminal
behavior and recognized mental illness.
There are obvious dangers when legislators begin to expand and
redefine the minimum psychological determination for indefinite
involuntary civil commitment.1 4 According to the American Psychiat-
ric Association:
If "mental illness" were freely subject to legislative defini-
tion (through new terms like "mental abnormality" or
otherwise), or if anyone "crazy" or "sick" enough to engage
in repeated serious offenses could be civilly confined for
that reason, the limits on deprivations of liberty to protect
the public safety would quickly disappear.1 5
Justice Thomas' conclusion that the "mental abnormality" requirement
contained in the Kansas statute is simply one of a "variety of expres-
sions to describe the mental condition of those properly subject to civil
confinement," 216 ignores the fact that "mental illness" has a precise
meaning in law and in science.
In the legal context, individuals are mentally ill when "impaired
psychological process renders them incapable of meeting some legally
relevant standard of adequate functioning. 2 7  Thus, a "mental
abnormality" or "personality disorder" does not rise to the level of
mental illness that would defeat criminal responsibility.218 In the
2902(h) (West 1994).
214. See Schopp, supra note 156, at 168. "Mental health commitment of dangerous persons
who are not mentally ill in order to control their behavior and protect the public, rather than to
provide health care, distorts the function of the mental health system and undermines the
legitimacy of mental health law by using it to circumvent the legitimate constraints on
government force contained in the criminal law." Id. at 169.
215. American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *21; see Stephen R.
McAllister, The Constitutionality of Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 419,454
(1997) (discussing the "legitimate concern about the State potentially having the power to label
any condition as 'mental illness' and justify involuntary civil commitment on that basis,
irrespective of medical and scientific knowledge").
216. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080. The accuracy of Justice Thomas' assumption is
questioned by Justice Kennedy. See id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "if it were
shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding
that civil detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it").
217. Schopp, supra note 156, at 170.
218. But see Brief of the Menninger Foundation, the American Alliance for Rights and
Responsibilities, Justice for All, The New York Chapter of Parents of Murdered Children,
Protecting Our Children, People Against Violent Crime, Victims Outreach, Inc., and Texans for
Equal Justice as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No.
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context of science/medicine, "[t]he term 'mental illness' is reserved for
psychological conditions that impair virtually every aspect of the lives
of people it affects. It does not apply to those who merely cannot resist
deviant sexual urges whose origin, in any case, is unrelated to mental
illness."2 9 In fact, some recent scientific data show that clinically
diagnosed mental illness may frequently be linked to violent behav-
ior.22 Thus, even if the Court's only, or primary, concern is prevent-
ing violence, eliminating the mental illness requirement may impede this
goal. Moreover, the legal and scientific definitions of "mental illness"
are not mentioned by the Hendricks court." Thus, the Court does not
find that Kansas' substitution of a mental illness requirement with a
prediction of future dangerousness threatens the legitimacy of its
confinement scheme.
State commitment schemes must be justified by either the state's
police power or its parens patriae power.2" If the state is acting under
95-1649) (stating that sexually violent predators (SVPs) "are responsible for their harmful
conduct, unlike the insane, but that SVPs may be less culpable than others, because SVPs suffer
from a mental affliction that makes them less able to resist certain criminal impulses")
[hereinafter Brief of the Menninger Foundation].
219. Brief for the National Mental Health Association, supra note 34, at *7. Mental
illnesses are specific conditions that result in a loss of contact with reality and can be treated
with medication and therapy. Violent sexual behavior is just that-behavior that is always under
voluntary control. The rapist or pedophile must decide to commit the sexual act-the mental
patient cannot. Bodine, supra note 140, at 106 n.13 (quoting the testimony of Dr. James D.
Reardon, a board-certified forensic and institutional psychiatrist, before the Washington State
Legislature in January 1990).
220. See I MODERN ScIENTIFIc EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
303 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the most recent data indicating that: the
prevalence of violence is over five times higher among people who meet criteria for a DSM-I
Axis I diagnosis, schizophrenia, major depression, or mania/bi-polar disorder (11-13%) than
among people who are not diagnosable (2%)) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
221. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076-86. Justice Thomas attempted to justify his omission
of any distinction between "mental illness" and terms such as "mental abnormality" or "mental
condition" by explaining that "[lIegal definitions... must 'take into account such issues as
individual responsibility... and competency,' [and] need not mirror those advanced by the
medical profession." See id. at 2081 (citation omitted). However, nowhere in the Court's
opinion or in the Kansas Act itself is there any discussion of "individual responsibility" or
"competency."
222. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country," and "refers traditionally to the
role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The history of mental health law reflects the perpetual tension
between police power concerns for individual liberty and parens patriae concerns for effective
treatment. See, e.g., JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM 4-20 (1992).
According to some commentators, the most recent social trends reduce the emphasis on civil
liberties and increase the importance of involuntary confinement (intended to protect society)
coupled with compelled treatment. See id. at 19-20.
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its police power, the existence of a mental illness must be proved.2
If the state is acting under its parens patriae power, treatment must be
the primary purpose of the confinement.2 In Kansas v. Hendricks,
Justice Thomas broke legal ground and departed from established
precedent when he upheld Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act while
specifically rejecting the only two possible bases for legitimacy. First,
Justice Thomas refused to require that Kansas prove that sexual
predators failed to meet some legally relevant standard of behavior.
Thus, Kansas cannot be acting under its police powers. Second, Justice
Thomas specifically rejected the parens patriae justification when he
found that treatment of sexual predators need not be the primary goal
of Kansas' confinement scheme. 6
On the question of treatment, Justice Thomas dismissed Hendricks'
claim that because the Kansas Act fails to offer any treatment to
confined individuals, it is "little more than disguised punishment."'
According to the Court, regardless of whether treatment is ineffec-
tive,22 or treatment was not the state's overriding concern,22 9 the
omission of a treatment purpose does not create any constitutional
infirmity or reveal any punitive intent.2 °
Justice Thomas' conclusion that treatment is irrelevant to the
legitimacy of the statute was directly disputed by Justice Breyer. Writing
for the dissent, Justice Breyer observed the following:
Kansas . . . concedes that Hendricks' condition is treatable;
yet the Act did not provide Hendricks (or others like him)
with any treatment until after his release date from prison
and only inadequate treatment thereafter. These, and certain
other, special features of the Act convince me that it was
223. See Morris, supra note 144, at 639-40 (describing how the courts must first decide
under what authority a state has derived its power to commit sexual predators, and then-if the
state is relying on its police powers-mental illness must be established).
224. The diagnosis and treatment of a mental illness is central to the determination of
whether a statute is civil or criminal. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("If the object or purpose of the Kansas law had been to provide treatment but the
treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere pretext, there would have been an
indication of the forbidden purpose to punish."); id. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
"one would expect a nonpunitive statutory scheme to confine, not simply in order to protect, but
also in order to cure); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (finding that a lack
of concern for treatment supports a finding of punitive intent).
225. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
226. See id. at 2083-85.
227. See id. at 2083.
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not simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather
an effort to inflict further punishment on him."
The Hendricks facts show that Kansas made no effort to provide
treatment to convicted sex offenders. The first time that the state even
considered the possibility of treatment for Hendricks was on the eve of
his release from prison, as part of its effort to continue his confine-
ment.232
Finally, Justice Thomas rejected Hendricks' claims of violation of
the Constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex post facto
lawmaking.z3 According to the Court, these claims must fail because
the Kansas Act is non-criminal. 4 In fact, Justice Thomas went so far
as to say that the post-sentence indefinite confinement of sexual
predators "does not implicate either of the two primary objectives of
criminal punishment: retribution"35 or deterrence., 236 This conclusion
is directly undermined by the testimony of the Kansas Attorney General,
which was part of the record before the Court:
Most new laws against criminal conduct tend to provide
punishment after the victimization has occurred. Senate Bill
525 [Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act] will act
prospectively and be preventative of criminal conduct and
not just punitive. You have a rare opportunity to pass a law
that will keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their
231. Id. at 2088 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2091-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[W]hen a State believes that treatment does exist, and then couples that admission with a
legislatively required delay of such treatment until a person is at the end of his jail term (so that
further incapacitation is therefore necessary), such a legislative scheme begins to look
punitive."); Gleb, supra note 8, at 215 (discussing the fact that the confinement of sexual
predators use the" 'promise of treatment... only to bring an illusion of benevolence to what
is essentially a warehousing operation for social misfits' ") (quoting Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d
1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); Janus, supra note 152, at 365 (discussing the use of science to
portray sex offender commitment laws as "holding out the promise of treatment rather than
criminal punishment, and confinement").
232. See Hendricks, 117 S. CL at 2088.
233. See id. at 2081.
234. See id. at 2086. According to the Court, if a state labels a statute civil, that designation
will be rejected "only where a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention
to deem it civil." Id. at 2082 (quotations omitted).
235. See also id. at 2082 ("The Act's purpose is not retributive because it does not affix
culpability for prior criminal conduct.").
236. Id.; see also id. ("Nor can it be said that the legislature intended the Act to function
as a deterrent. Those persons committed under the Act are ... suffering from a 'mental
abnormality' or a 'personality disorder'. ... [and]... are therefore unlikely to be deterred by
the threat of confinement.").
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scheduled prison sentence. As I am convinced none of them
should ever be released, I believe you, as legislators, have
an obligation to enact laws that will protect our citizens
through incapacitation of dangerous offenders. 37
Thus, it is difficult to give much weight to Justice Thomas' assertion
that the Kansas legislature was wholly unmotivated by considerations of
retribution or deterrence.23 According to the American Psychiatric
Association,
[t]he intent behind the Kansas Act, far from a parens
patriae purpose focused on serving the interests of those
subject to it, unmistakably focuses on incapacitation of such
criminals to neutralize their potential for doing harm to
others. The label "predator" connotes a purposeful actor to
whom the State's attitude is hostility and a desire to
restrain for other's sake, hardly empathic concern.239
Justice Thomas supported his assertion that the statute does not serve
the goals of retribution or deterrence by concluding that "[flar from any
punitive objective, the confinement's duration is instead linked to the
stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his
mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others."2"
However, this distinction is equally unpersuasive.
The fact that sex offenders can be released from commit-
ments when they demonstrate that they are no longer
dangerous is often cited as a basis for distinguishing sex
offender commitments from criminal prosecutions, but this
is only a contingent difference .... [T]his difference
generally does not inure to the benefit of the sex offender.
237. American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *13-14 (emphasis added)
(testimony of Kansas Attorney General in support of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act).
238. Criminal punishment is generally considered retributive because it requires that a
defendant deserve punishment for the offense. Similarly, deterrence can only be effective if an
individual is capable of controlling his behavior. The Kansas Act mandates indefinite civil
confinement for individuals who are not mentally ill. These individuals are appropriate targets
for both retribution and deterrence because, unlike the mentally ill, they presumably had the
necessary psychological capability to engage in practical reasoning regarding the conduct at
issue.
239. American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *13; see also Prevention
Versus Punishment, supra note 4, at 1714 (stating that "commitment legislation [for sexual
predators] literally immobilizes dangerous sexual deviants and, thus, presumably promotes both
immediate and long-term public safety").
240. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
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In fact, the fixed, though brief, length of many criminal
sentences is often cited as the chief justification for sex
offender commitments.... [S]ex offender commitments
are, in reality, lifetime incarcerations. 24'
Obviously, neither assurances by the Supreme Court, nor Kansas'
disavowal of any punitive purpose, means anything to the individual
subject to this potentially indefinite deprivation of liberty.
III. No RELIABLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
THREE CORE JUSTIFICATIONS UNDERLYING
RULES 413-415 AND THE SEXUAL
PREDATOR CONFINEMENT STATUTES
The enactment of Rules 413-415 and the Supreme Court's decision
in Kansas v. Hendricks demonstrate that legislators and the judiciary
have singled out sexual predators for separate and more stringent
treatment under the criminal laws. The wisdom and constitutionality of
both legal developments depend on three fundamental underlying
justifications: (1) that future sexual violence can be accurately predicted
based on allegations and evidence of prior sex crimes; (2) that sex
offenders have unusually high rates of recidivism; and (3) that certain
offenders specialize in sex crimes. Moreover, both statutory schemes
permit fact finders to arrive at these conclusions using uncharged and
unsupported allegations from an individual's remote past.242
The congressional sponsors of Rules 413-415 cited all three
fundamental assumptions in their efforts to enact the new evidentiary
rules. Proponents of Rules 413-415 successfully argued: (1) that the best
method for preventing future sex crimes is to enable prosecutors and
civil plaintiffs to use allegations and evidence of prior sexual offenses
to ensure convictions;243 (2) that sex offenders are especially likely to
241. Janus, supra note 192, at 191; see also infra notes 258-60 (discussing the obstacles
that must be overcome by the confined sexual predator who attempts to overturn this designation
and obtain release from confinement).
242. Under Rules 413-415, a jury may convict an individual for a sexual offense based, in
whole or part, on allegations and evidence of prior sexual offenses. Under the sexual predator
confinement statutes, similar allegations and evidence of prior sexual offenses are used to justify
confinement: however, this testimony is often presented in conjunction with expert analysis. See
Janus, supra note 152, at 355 (discussing the routine admission of expert testimony in civil
commitment cases, "despite the acknowledged shortcomings of the science underlying it").
243. In the words of a primary Congressional sponsor of Rules 413-415, "[t]he past conduct
of a person with a history of rape or child molestation provides evidence that he or she has the
combination of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes
and lacks the inhibitions against acting on these impulses." 140 CoNG. REC. H2433 (daily ed.
Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari); see also Livnah, supra note 7, at 176 (stating that
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be recidivists;2' and (3) that certain offenders specialize in sex
crimes.2 45 Although these justifications are based on assumptions
regarding the psychology of sexual aggression, recidivism, and criminal
specialization, Congress made no effort to support these assumptions
with any empirical or scientific evidence 6 or to distinguish among the
different types of offenses encompassed within Rules 413-415.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, along with
the text of the Kansas Act at issue, illustrate how sexual predator
confinement statutes rely on the same three fundamental assumptions.247
The statute itself states:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect
that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment
pursuant to the [Kansas general involuntary commitment
statute].... In contrast to persons appropriate for civil
commitment under [the Kansas general involuntary commit-
ment statute] ... , sexually violent predators generally have
antisocial personality features which are unamenable to
existing mental illness treatment modalities and those
features render them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually violent
under Rules 413-415, "sexual offenses, unlike other crimes, are treated with the further
presumption that evidence of prior acts or accusations is admissible to show the probability of
acting in conformity with a bad character as to similar offenses").
244. See 140 CONG. REc. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari)
(stating that sex crimes are generally committed by recidivists); 137 CONG. REC. S3240 (daily
ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
245. See 137 CONG. REC. 54925 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating
that the new rules would protect against "those criminals who prey on women"); 140 CONG.
REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (describing how Rules 413-
415 will protect the public from those criminals who commit acts of sexual violence).
246. Consider one commentator's comment:
[T]here appears to have been a widespread Congressional assumption that a special
rule of evidence is justified by some unusually high rate of recidivism among
sexual offenders, which would make evidence of such criminal histories of
unusually great probative value. But the legislative history contains no empirical
evidence to support that crucial assumption, and there is good reason to question
it.
See Duane, supra note 30, at 113.
247. See Janus, supra note 152, at 361 (discussing the fact that proponents of sexual
predator confinement statutes use science as "the central prop in their claim for constitutional
and policy legitimacy").
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predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predato-
ry violence is high.2 48
Thus, the Kansas Act first assumes that sex offenders are especially
likely to engage in "repeat acts of predatory violence. 2 49 The Kansas
Act incorporates the second justification by presuming that a class of
sexually violent predators can be identified and defined based on their
criminal specialization. The third assumption was made explicit by
Justice Thomas in his decision upholding the Act. According to the
Hendricks Court, the role of prior allegations and evidence of sex
offenses is critical to the confinement decision because, " '[p]revious
instances of violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent
tendencies.' "'
A. There Is No Reliable Empirical Evidence
that Future Sex Offenses Can Be
Accurately Predicted
Predictions of future dangerousness are central to the justifications
underlying both Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement
statutes.2' However, psychiatric and psychological diagnoses are not
immutably true insights into human behavior; instead, they are efforts
to understand and explain patterns of behavior using scientific methods
and theory 52 According to the American Psychiatric Association,
248. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1994) (emphasis added).
249. American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *1, *7-8 ("Validity of the
Kansas Act would.., require a general state power to confine people indefinitely based on
predictions that they would 'likely' cause serious harm. Such a power has never been approved
by this [Supreme] Court and would threaten our most basic traditions of liberty.").
250. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993)).
The Kansas Attorney General introduced evidence against Hendricks that included a 39-year-old
plea agreement to indecent exposure, a 37-year-old conviction for lewdness, a 34-year-old
conviction for molestation, and a 31-year-old conviction for sexual assault. See id. at 2078. The
court also heard testimony from Hendricks' stepchildren regarding uncharged sexual abuse that
had allegedly occurred 22 years earlier. See id. at 2079 n.2.
251. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing how congressional
proponents of Rules 413-415 successfully argued that the new rules were necessary to protect
women and children from rapists and child molesters who, unless convicted, were likely to
become repeat sex offenders); supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Thomas' definition of "mental illness" in Hendricks which "requires evidence of past sexually
violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the
future"); see also Brief of the Menninger Foundation, supra note 218, at *17 (stating that Rules
413-415 "illustrate the widespread professional consensus that prior incidents of child
molestation are legitimately probative to show a defendant's propensity to commit additional
acts of the same nature").
252. The inability of psychiatric professionals to predict violence has been specifically
549
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"there is, in the area of psychiatric prediction of violence by the
mentally ill, nothing like the level of certainty applicable to a contagious
disease." 3
Mental health experts have sought to discover reliable techniques for
predicting violent behavior." However, it is generally accepted in the
scientific community that predictions of future dangerousness are, at
best, only one-third accurate. 5 This means that at least 66% of all
positive predictions of future violence will be mistaken and these so-
called "dangerous" individuals will not commit the predicted future
crimes. 6 In fact, even the most positive assessment of clinicians'
abilities to predict future violence has concluded that "representative
data from the past [two] decades suggests that clinicians are able to
distinguish violent from nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-
chance level of accuracy."25
recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (There are
"difficulties inherent in diagnosis of mental illness.... It is thus no surprise that many
psychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate."); Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric
diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.").
253. American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *18.
254. 'There is a long tradition in criminology of using statistical (often called actuarial)
techniques in predicting recidivism by release prisoners." MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra
note 220, at 309 (citing JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 322-28 (3d ed. 1994)).
255. See Bochnewich, supra note 9, at 293-94 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981) (noting the one-third accuracy rate is "widely
accepted")); see also JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 48
(1981) (stating that most studies of long-term predictions by psychiatrists have found that only
one out of five or six predictions of violent behavior are accurate); Thomas Grisso & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence?, 16 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 621, 626 (1992) (the research shows that expert predictions of violence are merely
matters of probabilities are rarely more than 50% accurate).
It should be noted that following John Monahan's seminal work on the validity of clinical
predictions of violence, there was only one study of violence predictability published between
1979 and 1993. This study concluded that 39% of defendants whose pretrial mental health
assessment indicated a medium or high likelihood of future dangerousness had committed a
dangerous act during a two-year follow-up. See MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 220,
at 308 (citing Diana S. Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two Year Follow-
up of 408 Pre-trial Forensic Cases, 11 BULL. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE L.
171 (1983)).
256. See Bochnewich, supra note 9, at 294 (citation omitted).
257. Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Volence: Being Accurate About Accuracy,
62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 790 (1994); see also MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 220, at 312 (discussing the fact that studies of post-hospitalization
violence are suspect because they "suffer from the additional selection bias that only those
patients clinically predicted to be non-violent were released").
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In fact, predictions of future violence are so inaccurate and unreliable
that in Barefoot v. Estelle,'' 8 Justice Blackmun specifically stated that
"the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field [is] that
psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong more
often than they are right." 9 The American Psychological Association
reached a similar conclusion when it determined that "the validity of
psychological predictions of violent behavior... is extremely poor, so
poor that one could oppose their use on the strictly empirical grounds
that psychologists are not professionally competent to make such
judgments. ' ' " Obviously, there is a real danger that incorrect predic-
tions of future sex offenses are just as likely to be acted upon by the
judge or jury. "The jury can be guided by any kind of testimony from
anyone who has data that may be useful, but often the predictions of a
psychiatrist concerning the future dangerousness of the defendant are the
most convincing testimony for the jury."61
Despite this lack of reliable empirical support, legislators based Rules
413-415 and the sexual predator confinement statutes on the assumption
that judges and juries can use allegations and evidence of prior sexual
offenses to determine guilt and predict future dangerousness. Under both
statutory schemes, these prognostications may be based on allegations
and evidence of prior sex offenses stretching back throughout the
accused's lifetime.262 Under these circumstances, the use of remote
258. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
259. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278-79
(1984) (noting that predictions of future dangerousness form "an important element in many
decisions, and we have specifically rejected the contention... 'that it is impossible to predict
future behavior' ") (quotation omitted).
260. Report of the Task Force on the Role Of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System,
33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978); see also Charles P. Ewing, "Dr: Death" and the
Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in
Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 407, 409 (1983) ("Over the past two
decades, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that psychiatric and psychological
predictions of dangerousness generally prove to be inaccurate."); Gleb, supra note 8, at 224-25
("[Tihere is widespread agreement among psychiatrists that clinical predictions of long-term
dangerousness are highly unreliable."); Robert Menzies et al., The Dimensions of Dangerousness
Revisited, 18 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 1, 25 (1994) ("[O]n the critical question-namely,
whether experts or instruments can reliably and validly differentiate between potentially violent
and innocuous human subjects-the overwhelming body of empirical evidence remains highly
equivocal.").
261. JONAS ROBrrSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 198 (1980) (discussing death
penalty determinations).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 89 & 97 (discussing the fact that in United States
v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1997), the court concluded that under Rule 413 "[n]o time
limit is imposed on the uncharged offenses for which evidence may be admitted; as a practical
matter, evidence of other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly admitted,
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allegations and evidence, which raise the specter of prejudice, due
process violations, and mistake, presents a significant threat to the
fundamental principles of fairness and impartiality underlying our
criminal justice system."'
Moreover, sexual predator confinement schemes that allow judges to
use allegations and evidence of remote past offenses are a significant
departure from well-established general civil confinement procedures.
Standard civil commitments are usually triggered by
relatively recent acts of violence or threatening behavior.
The issue for prediction is whether the individual will be
violent in the relatively short term. On the other hand, sex
offender commitment predictions are likely to be based on
violence that is quite remote, occurring often years or
decades before the commitment proceedings .... In
addition, sex offender commitment statutes appear to be
aimed at long term, rather than short term, predictions. Both
recency of past violence and short future horizons are
thought to enhance predictive accuracy."
In addition, general civil commitment procedures, unlike sexual predator
determinations, require a diagnosis of mental illness.2 65 Predictions of
violence predicated on a finding of mental illness are arguably more
reliable because they are based upon the observation of active psychiat-
ric/psychological symptoms.266 By contrast, it is more difficult to
notwithstanding substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or offenses."); supra
note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that under the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predators Act, upheld by the Supreme Court in Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078, Kansas used
allegations and evidence that dated back as far as 39 years to confine Hendricks as a sexual
predator).
263. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (describing how the introduction of
remote allegations and evidence against an accused under Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator
confinement statutes increase the possibilities of prejudice, due process violations, and mistake).
264. Gleb, supra note 8, at 237 ("[I]n one crucial respect, it is easier for the state to confine
sexual predators than the mentally ill. ... Sexual predators can be confined without any recent
overt evidence of dangerousness, unlike mentally ill confinees."); Janus, supra note 192, at 200-
01 (citations omitted); see Stephen Lally, Steel Beds v. Iron Bars; New Laws Muddle How to
Handle Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at C1 (discussing the fact that in civil
commitment proceedings "[t]he potential for danger needs to be immediate").
265. A "mental illness" diagnosis is not required for the imposition of either Rules 413-415
or the sexual predator confinement statutes. But see Pickett, supra note 23, at 903 (proposing
that a finding of mental compulsion should be a threshold test for admissibility of prior sexual
offenses under Rules 413-415).
266. See Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Evidence of a Link Between Mental Illness and
Violence, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 663, 665 (1994) (stating that "[a]ctive
symptoms are probably more important as a risk factor than is simply the presence of an
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predict the future behavior of sex offenders who are frequently
"[p]ersons whose mental afflictions leave them with a measure of self-
control... [because] they retain the ability to plan, wait, and delay the
indulgence of their maladies until presented with a higher probability of
success."
267
Finally, psychiatrists and psychologists have consistently refused to
designate a particular mental illness that explains sexual violence.26
This resistance can be explained by the fact that rape and other forms
of sexual violence are not considered to be the result of one consistent
type of mental illness. 269 In fact, there is a general consensus in the
mental health community that the psychological factors that contribute
to sex offenses are not distinct from the psychological factors that may
contribute to other forms of violence.27 0 Thus, the fact that there is
identifiable disorder") (emphasis omitted).
267. See In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. Ct. App.), aff'd, 557 N.W.2d 171
(Minn. 1996); see also Gina Kolata, The Many Myths About Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 1996, § 4, at 10 (citing the research of Dr. Raymond Rosen, professor of psychiatry at the
Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, finding that 40% of pedophiles are not motivated by
uncontrollable sexual urges but instead are "acting out aggressively with women or children"
or "are criminal types who will break society's laws in any way they can").
268. Most mental health professionals believe that sex offenses are not the product of
mental illness. See, e.g., Adarsh Kaul, Sex Offenders-Cure or Management?, 33 MED. Sci. L.
207, 208 (1993) (stating that each sex offender "presents a unique combination of sexual,
emotional and situational difficulties" so that sexual offenses are only "[o]ccasionally ... a
result of mental illness"). In fact, sexual predator confinement laws have been widely criticized
within the mental health community. See, e.g., Hammel, supra note 140, at 804 (discussing the
mental health community's striking opposition to sexual psychopath and sexually violent
predator laws in the face of strong public pressure).
269. See Raymond A. Knight & Robert A. Prentky, Classifying Sexual Offenders: The
Development and Corroboration of Taxonomic Models, HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT:
ISSUES, THEORIES, AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER 23 (W.L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990)
(proposing four separate classifications for sex offenders: opportunistic, pervasively angry,
sexual, and vindictive); Hammel, supra note 140, at 802 ("[A] diagnosis of mental illness that
may subject one to confinement should at least be reasonably well defined and accepted in the
psychiatric community."); Schopp, supra note 156, at 168 ("The sexual predator statutes are
particularly problematic, however, because they address certain offenders as both responsible for
their offenses under the criminal law and civilly committable with no clear explanation or
justification.").
270. See Hammel, supra note 140, at 804 n.236 ("There is no distinct line between sex
offenders and other law violators ... sex offenders have been found to suffer from no single
category of mental pathology; the same varying symptoms of basic difficulties are also found
in thieves, murderers, burglars and extortionists.") (quoting HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 28 n.6 (1954)); see also Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for
Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV.
54, 59 (1982) ("The primary theoretical reason for allowing involuntary commitment of only the
mentally disordered is the belief that their legally relevant behavior is the inexorable product of
uncontrollable disorder, whereas the legally relevant behavior of normal persons is the product
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little consensus on the cause of sexually offensive behavior makes
predictions about the effects, sexual violence, even more difficult and
unreliable.
B. There Is No Reliable Empirical Evidence that
Sex Offenders Have a Higher Rate of
Recidivism than Other Offenders
There is no reliable empirical evidence that criminal recidivism rates
are greater among sex offenders than among any other group of
offenders.27 In fact, statistical analyses of sex offender recidivism
statistics indicate that sex offenders' rates are lower than the rates of
most other criminal offenders. 2 In addition, "[t]he variety and gravity
of methodological problems in existing [sex offender] recidivism
of free choice.") (citation omitted).
271. See Nancy Hobbs, The Bogeyman May Be Closer than You Think; Pedophiles Often
Know Victims, Psychologists Say, SALT LAKE CrrY TRIB., Apr. 28, 1997, at D2 (citing a
spokesman of the Utah Department of Corrections finding that "[t]he recidivism rate is
significantly lower for all sex offenders than for other types of criminals.... [w]here the normal
recidivism rate is 47 percent, the rate for all sex offenders is between 20 and 30 percent");
Simon, supra note 7, at 392 ("[nhere is currently no empirical evidence to suggest that sex
offenders have different recidivism rates than nonsex offenders."). But see, e.g., Brief for the
National Mental Health Association, supra note 34, at *3 ("Leading researchers have concluded
that sexually violent criminal behavior is relatively intractable, and there is little evidence that
treatment effectively reduces recidivism."); Kristen Delguzzi, Controversy Stalks Sexual Predator
Laws, THE CINCINNATI ENQUMER, June 30, 1997, at Al (citing a 1989 study of Ohio prisoners
showing a 45.2% recidivism rate for sex offenders and a 44.7% recidivism rate for all other
violent offenders); Margit C. Henderson & Seth C. Kalichman, Sexually Deviant Behavior and
Schizotypy: A Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data, 61 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 273, 273 (1990)
(citing the results of a study in which child molesters self-reported an average of 72 victims).
Moreover, neither statutory scheme presents any empirical evidence to support the two
assumptions necessary to justify the recidivism claim: (1) that allegations and evidence of prior
sex offenses is more predictive of future sex offenses than predictive of future non-sexual
offenses; and (2) that allegations and evidence of past sexual offenses, rather than past non-
sexual offenses, are more predictive of future sex offenses.
272. See Livnah, supra note 7, at 171 n. 16 (citing a 1989 Bureau of Justice Statistics study
that found that "31.9% of released burglars were rearrested for burglary, 24.8% of drug
offenders were rearrested for a drug offense, 19.6% of violent robbers were rearrested for
robbery, while only 7.7% of rapists were rearrested for rape"); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol
Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 127, 155 (1993) (citing studies showing that "[tihe national recidivism rate for rearrest
within three years [is] ... 65%" for serious criminals in general, 50% for violent criminals, 30%
for pedophiles and adolescent child abusers, and 25% for rapists); The Sex Offender Down the
Block, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 199.7, at 2B (citing study by the United States
Department of Justice showing that "rapists have one of the lowest rates of recidivism-about
one-fifth that of burglars" and research from Johns Hopkins showing an eight percent recidivism
rate among pedophiles).
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studies ... often undermines confidence in their results."273 For
example, compiling the results of various sex offender recidivism studies
is complicated by the fact that there is no single consistent definition of
what constitutes recidivism for sex offenders.2 4 A comprehensive
review of interpretable sex offender recidivism results concluded that
there is "such variability among study results, [that] it is difficult to
make any meaningful statement about the number of sex offenders who
continue to commit sex offenses" '27 and that "progress in our knowl-
edge about sex offender recidivism will continually elude us until
adequate resources of time, money, and research expertise are devoted
to this issue."'276
It is also difficult to assess how sex offender recidivism rates are
affected by different treatment methods. 7  The value of different
therapeutic practices and their effects on recidivism is uncertain.278
273. Lita Furbey et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 4
(1989).
274. See id at 7-8 (discussing the fact that depending on the study, recidivism may be
defined as: (1) "reconviction for the same type of offense," (2) "recommission [without
conviction] of the same type of offense," (3) "recommission [without conviction] of any sex
offense," or (4) recommission, without conviction, of any type of offense).
275. Id. at 22.
276. Id. at 27.
277. This difficulty is attributable, in part, to the fact that sex offender "treatment is still
in its infancy." See Lally, supra note 256; see also Barbara K. Schwartz, Effective Treatment
Techniques for Sex Offenders, 22 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 315 (1992) (stating that until the late
1970s and early 1980s state legislators accepted the philosophy that sex offenders would not
benefit from psychiatric treatment). In addition, there is no way to measure successful treatment.
All of the existing data is based upon the determination that treatment has failed, following an
offender's reconviction, rearrest, or recommission of a criminal offense.
278. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 ("Hendricks' argument assumes that treatment for
his condition is available, but that the State has failed (or refused) to provide it.... [However],
'[t]he record reflects that treatment for sexually violent predators is all but nonexistent.' ")
(quoting In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996)); Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150,
1155 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding no evidence to support the claim that sexual psychopaths are
treatable), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.)
(stating that treatment of sex offenders is often "problematic"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146
(1994); see also Furby et al., supra note 273, at 27 ("There is as yet no evidence that clinical
treatment reduces rates of sex reoffenses in general and no appropriate data for assessing
whether it may be differentially effective for different types of offenders.") But see The Sex
Offender Down the Block, supra note 272, at B2 (citing research showing that pedophiles who
receive treatment have only a 3% recidivism rate); Brief of the Association for the Treatment
of Sexual Abusers, supra note 150, at 8 ('There is increasing evidence.., that state-of-the-art
treatment programs developed over the last decade significantly reduce [sex offender]
recidivism."); W.L. Marshall & W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome with Sex
Offenders, 21 CRiM. JUST. & BEHAV. 10, 10-24 (1994) (arguing that the disappointing results
of prior sex offender treatment programs is the result of obsolete and limited treatment programs
and that current comprehensive treatment regimes are beginning to show promising results).
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Current treatment for pedophila, for example, includes psychotherapy
(seeking to alter behavior through self-understanding), cognitive
behavioral therapies, (including therapies designed to create aversion
towards pedophilic impulses), and pharmacological treatments (using
medication to dampen the sex drive). 79 These treatments, in varying
degrees, provide some benefits;28 however, there is little empirical
evidence of the effectiveness of any specific treatment program. There
is certainly no evidence to support the assumption-contained in the
sexual predator confinement statutes-that sex offenders have unique
treatment needs that differ from other offenders.281 In fact, civil
commitment may be anti-therapeutic when applied to individuals who
are not mentally ill and, display the degree of autonomy and comprehen-
sion necessary to establish criminal responsibility.282
Despite the lack of empirical support, Rules 413-415 and the sexual
predator confinement statutes are based on the assumption that sex
offenders are more likely to be recidivists than other offenders.283 The
recidivism argument was explicitly advanced by the congressional
sponsors of Rules 413-415.2' In the context of the sexual predator
confinement statutes, the assumption of higher rates of recidivism was
279. See American Psychiatric Association Brief, supra note 137, at *27-28.
280. See id. at *29 n.26 (citing summary of treatment methods for pedophilia contained in
the General Accounting Office Report, Sex Offender Treatment: Research Results Inconclusive
About What Works to Reduce Recidivism at 20-21 (June 1996)). But see Furby et al., supra note
273, at 25 (concluding that treatment is generally ineffective based on two studies, one
comparing treated offenders with those who had declined treatment within the same program and
a second comparing studies of treated offenders with independent studies of untreated offenders).
281. See Janus, supra note 152, at 376 (stating that "the needs sex offenders have for
treatment could be met in prison or other settings, and therefore do not justify hospitalization").
But see Brief for the National Mental Health Association, supra note 34 ("Mental health
facilities are largely unequipped to handle the treatment need of violent sexual predators, and
lack the experience necessary to deal with such a population.").
282. See Janus, supra note 192, at 212 ("Civil commitment... undermines the fundamental
assumption of humanity and free agency. In this sense, it is anti-therapeutic when it is applied
to people whose freedom and autonomy are sufficient for responsibility.... And, it is anti-
therapeutic because its message is contrary to the central theme of rehabilitation, that violent
offenders can, and must, take responsibility for their own actions."); see also Janus, supra note
152, at 377 (stating that the assertion that disordered sex offenders lack control "is a
generalization that the scientific literature directly contradicts") (citations omitted).
283. See e.g., Dealing with Sex Offenders (National Public Radio broadcast, July 22, 1997),
available in 1997 WL 12821159 (discussing the fact that California Governor Pete Wilson
proclaimed that "sex offenders have a 90% recidivism rate," despite the fact that the most recent
statistics from The U.S. Department of Justice show that only 8% of rapists will be rearrested
for rape); Attorney Presses Child Molester's Quest for Anonymity Communities, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1997, at A3 (quoting California Assemblywoman Barbara Alby's statement that sex
offense "is a crime that we know has unbelievably high recidivism rates").
284. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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used to justify the requirement that individuals remain confined until
they can affirmatively establish that they are no longer a danger to
themselves or others.285
There are at least four fundamental flaws inherent to the recidivism
justification for Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement
statutes. First, as discussed above, there is no empirical evidence that
sex offenders have higher recidivism rates than other offenders. In fact,
their rates may be lower than the rates of other offenders. Second, such
purportedly scientific evidence presented by the prosecutor is extremely
difficult for the accused to undermine.286 Third, once an individual has
been deemed by a court to be a sexual predator and found to pose a
direct danger to society, it is difficult for this determination to be
undone. This difficulty is enhanced by the fact that most sexual predator
confinement statutes keep discharge decisions within the control of the
same court that initially made the commitment decision. 7 Thus, the
confining court and the state's mental health experts have every
incentive to avoid the responsibility (and possible liability) that might
result from any guarantee of the sexual predator's future safe behavior,
while continued confinement of the sexual predator presents no negative
consequences to these decision-makers. Fourth, the confinement setting
usually does not provide adequate opportunities to observe or evaluate
progress in the treatment of the sex offender, simply because the
opportunity to commit such crimes is not available. Thus, observed good
behavior is considered less predictive of the progress towards elimina-
tion of the mental abnormality288 and can easily be discounted when
compared to past violence. For example, since 1975 not one person
committed as a sex offender in the state of Minnesota has been
released.289
285. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (questioning
whether a prisoner could ever prove that he was no longer a danger to himself or others if the
state has previously established that he has no control over his sexual impulses), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 146 (1994); Gleb, supra note 8, at 216 (Sexual predator confinement statutes
"create[ ] a very high risk that people who would not repeat their crimes if free will be held
indefinitely under conditions that make it hard for them to show that they are not dangerous.").
286. See Gleb, supra note 8, at 234 (discussing the fact that a psychiatric expert for the
defense would be unable to offer reliable countervailing predictions of non-dangerousness, but
would be limited to critiquing the expertise of the prosecution's expert).
287. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a10 (West 1994).
288. See In re Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that
"good behavior in the artificial environment of a hospital is not conclusive on the question of
dangerousness to the public, experts testify the proposed patient remains mentally ill and
dangerous").
289. See Janus, supra note 192, at 206.
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C. There Is No Reliable Empirical Evidence
that Sex Offenders Specialize in
One Type of Crime
Criminological research shows that most criminal offenders do not
specialize in one type of crime."9 The idea of criminal specialization
comes from the desire to attach labels to offenders so that policy
decisions can appear to target the specific criminal acts that are at the
forefront of public attention. However, labeling an individual as a "sex
offender" based solely on a past arrest or conviction for rape or child
molestation is not only misleading, in itself,2 ' but can result in
misguided and ineffective legislative decisions. The empirical evidence
shows that few criminals specialize in sex offenses. 2 "[T]he idea that
sex offenders specialize results from official focus on the most serious
crimes that an offender commits. Perceived specialization ignores
criminal and deviant behavior that is inconsistent with the perceived
specialty. The belief in specialization, however, can result in legal
policies that adversely affect public safety." '293 The assumption that sex
offenders specialize presupposes that these individuals are somehow
unique and identifiable.29 However, existing evidence shows instead
that individuals who commit sex offenses cannot be identified by their
criminal patterns of behavior because, like all other repeat offenders,
290. See Leonore M. J. Simon, Do Criminal Offenders Specialize in Crime Types? 6
APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 35 (1997); see also Larry E. Beutler et al., Evaluation of
"Fixed Propensity" to Commit Sexual Offenses: A Preliminary Report, 22 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 284, 284-86 (1995) (describing how legal and mental health professionals often
mistakenly view criminal offenders as specialists because the data showing a lack of
specialization is not well known outside the field of criminology).
291. See Furby et al., supra note 273, at 5 ("[A]ny classification scheme based solely on
the instant offense could be misleading.").
292. See Laureen Aljazireh, Historical, Environmental, and Behavioral Correlates of Sexual
Offending by Male Adolescents: A Critical Review, 11 BEHAV. SCl. & L. 423 (1993) (stating that
even within a purported class of sex offenders there is no evidence of specialization by type of
sexual crime); Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by Sex
Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 297 (1991) (stating that sex offenders do not
specialize by type of victim, i.e., adult v. child, stranger v. nonstranger).
293. See Simon, supra note 7, at 387.
294. See Furby et al., supra note 273, at 5 ("inhere is now rather compelling evidence that
most sex offenders suffer from multiple paraphilias. For example, a rapist (based on the instant
offense) is fairly likely to have had sexual contact with a minor female during his adult life.")
(citation omitted); Simon, supra note 7, at 387, 390 n.9 (describing how the standard
psychophysiological assessment device for sex offenders, penile plethysmography (which is used
to determine which stimuli elicit sexual arousal in male subjects), has questionable validity and
reliability).
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they are equally likely to engage in repeat acts of nonsexual criminal
and delinquent behavior. 5
In 1997, Dr. Leonore M.J. Simon published the results of an
extensive study testing the assumption that sex offenders are special-
ists."9 This study compared patterns of criminal specialization against
patterns of criminal versatility among three group of offenders: (1)
general violent offenders; (2) rapists; and (3) child molesters."9 Dr.
Simon began by contrasting the criminal behavior of the general violent
offenders to the rapists.29 Analysis of this data revealed that "both
types of offenders show substantial recorded versatility of offending....
[and] have comparable records for nonviolent crimes such as theft,
burglary, and drug offenses."2  The study found the same degree of
versatility among the child molesters."° Thus, Dr. Simon found no
empirical support for the assumption of sex offense specialization.
The implications of Dr. Simon's study are profound. Based on the
correlation of recent and extensive criminological data, Dr. Simon
concluded that "[p]redictions of future dangerousness based on past
sexual offending are bound to be inaccurate.""3 ° Because Dr. Simon
found no statistical support for the assumption that so-called "sex
offenders" are more likely to commit sex crimes than any other type of
crime, this empirical evidence severely discredits the final core
justification for both Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement
statutes-that certain criminals specialize in sex offenses.
Without the assumption of criminal specialization, it makes no sense,
in the context of Rules 413-415, to permit prosecutors and civil
claimants to admit allegations and evidence of prior sex offenses to
prove that the defendant is more likely to have committed the charged
crime. Similarly, there is no empirical support for the assumption that
the indefinite civil commitment of sexual predators will decrease future
sex crime rates. This study shows that "[ilt cannot be predicted that a
295. See Aljazireh, supra note 292, at 430 (estimating that 40%-60% of all adolescent
sexual offenders have a nonsexual criminal history).
296. See Simon, supra note 7, at 393-403 (providing seven tables to depict the results).
297. See id. at 393.
298. See id. at 395.
299. Id.
300. See id. at 399. Dr. Simon explains that although her multivariate findings indicate that
child molesters are less versatile than other offenders, see id. at 400, this is the likely result of:
(1) the different data sources available for child molesters; (2) the lack of self-reports for this
group; and/or (3) the selective prosecution of this group of offenders in response to the high
publicity that surrounds these drimes. See id.
301. Id. at 402.
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given sex offender's next crime will be a sex crime, just as it cannot be
predicted that a convicted robber will next commit another robbery."3"
V. CONCLUSION
"As soon as men decide that all means are permitted to
fight an evil, then their good becomes indistinguishable
from the evil that they set out to destroy.
' 303
The sexual predator is the true crime vampire. Congress and the
Supreme Court attributed demonic characteristics to one type of criminal
behavior when they armed prosecutors and civil claimants with the
special tools of Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement
statutes to battle this perceived fiend. However, when the justifications
and assumptions used to support these legal schemes are examined, we
may discover that those assigned to protect society are motivated by
public hatred and vindictiveness rather than fundamental legal principles
of impartiality and reason.
In their rush to quell public fears and satisfy perceived community
desires for revenge, legislators and the judiciary have created separate
rules of criminal justice applied only to those accused of sex offenses.
The recently devised comprehensive program to eradicate the sexual
predator uses Rules 413-415 to introduce allegations and evidence of all
of the defendant's prior sex offenses against him at trial, and
then-after he has been convicted, sentenced, and served his full
sentence-permits the use of these same allegations and evidence to
confine him indefinitely within the prison system. These two statutes
were enacted with little discussion of, or concern for, the fact that they
will dramatically increase the probability of prejudice, due process
violations, and mistake, for individuals accused of one type of crime.
Instead, these enhanced methods of conviction and detention have been
justified with scientific-sounding core assumptions °4 that are unsup-
ported by reliable empirical evidence.
Rules 413-415 and the sexual predator confinement statutes erode
individual rights by enhancing the government's ability to convict,
incarcerate, and indefinitely detain individuals who commit crimes that
302. Id. at 401.
303. CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE JUDGMENT OF THE NATIONS (1942).
304. See Janus, supra note 152, at 378 (describing how unsupported statements purporting
to explain sexual violence are "devastating to the claim of legitimacy through science" and the
fact that "courts fail to avail themselves of existing science where it would be most informa-
tive-in making generalizations about groups of people---calls into question the bona fides of
the entire science claim").
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are currently viewed as particularly abhorrent. Together these laws
create two obvious dangers. The first danger is that as public opinion
changes, the path has been cleared for legislators to use these same
flawed assumptions to justify enhanced methods of conviction and
confinement for additional offenses. This would enable lawmakers and
judges to deny certain individuals their constitutional rights and liberties
whenever the tide of fear, hatred, and revenge turns to a new criminal
behavior."05
The second danger arises when legislators and the judiciary are
permitted to blur the distinctions between punishment of responsible
criminal actors and treatment of the mentally ill. A democratic society
has only two legitimate means to deprive an individual of liberty, its
police power and its parens patraei power. The distinction between
these two methods of advancing social goals preserves both the moral
force of the criminal law and the unique role of the mental health
system.
The mental health component applies only to those who
suffer legal mental illness because addressing competent
practical reasoners within the mental health component
distorts the conventional public morality by misrepresenting
the standards of competence and culpability. This distortion
denigrates the defendants, misleads the public, and under-
mines the moral force of the larger institution of social
control.s 6
If, as the empirical evidence indicates, there is no legitimate basis for
disparate treatment of sex offenders-mental health professionals and
psychiatric hospitals should not be converted into wardens and jails.
The problem of sexual violence is real. To protect the safety of the
public, sex offenders must be subjected to some form of social control.
However, the government must adopt procedures for convicting and
confining sex offenders that reflect the fair, impartial, and consistent
application of fundamental legal principles. The goal of public safety
305. See Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 4, at 1728 ("[C]ourts must be especially
attentive to legislative enactments that 'use[ ] [sic] public health and safety rhetoric to justify
procedures that are, in essence, punishment and detention.' ") (quoting Artway, 876 F. Supp.
666, 687 (D.N.J. 1995), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also
Greg Moran, Fighting Criminal Activity with Civil Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 15,
1997, at Al (discussing the fact that prosecutors are turning to civil methods of law enforcement
(i.e., sexual predator confinement laws, injunctions, civil forfeiture) more frequently and how,
according to one commentator, these civil tactics "make an end-run around protections built into
criminal laws").
306. Schopp, supra note 156, at 181.
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can and should be met through the use of the police power, by such
efforts as: (1) longer sentences;3" (2) decreased plea bargains for
shorter terms; (3) prosecutors seeking consecutive rather than concurrent
prison terms; (4) recidivism statutes used to lengthen terms; (5) parole
and probation restrictions to increase oversight on non-incarcerated
offenders. The "sexual predator" classification should not be used to
justify enhanced methods of conviction or confinement unless the factual
basis for this distinction among offenders can be established to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty and the state is unable to pursue
its interests through normal criminal justice procedures.38
307. See Brief for the National Mental Health Association, supra note 34, at *3 (stating that
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act was "an attempt to remedy the effects, beginning in
the late 1970s, of lenient sentencing practices for sexually violent offenders").
308. In fact, the medical evidence shows that the criminal justice system may be just as
effective as the mental health system at providing treatment for sex offenders. See Janus, supra
note 192, at 206 (describing how all forms of sex offender treatment currently employed are
equally available and equally effective within the criminal and civil confinement systems); see
also Letters from the People, ANCORAGE DAILY NEws, Oct. 11, 1997, 14D (containing a
statement by psychiatrist, Dr. Lee M. Griffin, that "[t]his ruling [Kansas v. Hendricks] has lead
to outcries from psychiatrists... who state that the ruling is actually life imprisonment in a state
hospital using 'mental or personality disorder' as a pretext to fill in the void left by inadequate
prison sentences and prison overcrowding").
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